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Abstract
This paper investigates the consumption and risk taking decision of an economic agent
with partial irreversibility of consumption decision by formalizing the theory proposed by
Duesenberry (1949). The optimal policies exhibit a type of the (s, S) policy: there are
two wealth thresholds within which consumption stays constant. Consumption increases
or decreases at the thresholds and after the adjustment new thresholds are set. The share
of risky investment in the agent’s total investment is inversely U-shaped within the (s,
S) band, which generates time-varying risk aversion that can fluctuate widely over time.
This property can explain puzzles and questions on asset pricing and households’ portfolio
choices, e.g., why aggregate consumption is so smooth whereas the high equity premium
is high and the equity return has high volatility, why the risky share is so low whereas
the estimated risk aversion by the micro-level data is small, and whether and when an
increase in wealth has an impact on the risky share. Also, the partial irreversibility model
can explain both the excess sensitivity and the excess smoothness of consumption.
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1
1 Introduction
This critique is based on a demonstration that two fundamental assumptions
of aggregate demand theory are invalid. These assumptions are (1) that every
individual’s consumption behaviour is independent of that of every other indi-
vidual, and (2) that consumption relations are reversible in time (Duesenberry,
1949).
This paper analyzes a model of consumption and portfolio choice decision. Building
on the second part of the quote by Duesenberry (1949) as a critique of the Keynesian con-
sumption function, we aim to model the irreversibility of consumption decision. However,
we are also aware that each consumption decision is not fully irreversible, but partially
irreversible. Thus, we model the partial irreversibility by introducing proportional costs
for each consumption adjustment. The partial irreversibility makes consumption a non-
smooth function of wealth and change infrequently over time, demonstrating the excess
sensitivity and the excess smoothness for moderate shocks. The risky share of the house-
hold is U-shaped, which can reconcile several conflicting views in the literature, regarding
time-varying risk aversion and the impact of a wealth change on risky investments.
In our model, conditional on consumption never changing, the household has the
von-Neuman Morgenstern preference such as the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
preference. However, there is a utility cost proportional to the current level of marginal
utility whenever the household increases or decreases the consumption level. The former is
a learning cost in increasing the consumption level1 and the latter represents consumption
ratcheting. Note that the existence of the utility cost from decreasing consumption is
important in our model since the model can generate all the properties derived in our
model only with the cost of downward adjustment.2
The optimal polices exhibit a (s, S) type of policy as follows. Suppose the current
consumption level is c. Then, there are two wealth thresholds cx and cx¯, where x and x¯
are constants, i.e., the current (s, S) band is interval (cx, cx¯). In this case, consumption
increases and decreases if and only if the wealth level hits cx and cx¯, respectively. Other-
wise, consumption stays constant inside the band. Once a boundary is reached, the new
consumption level, cnew is set and the next new (s, S) band is updated as (cnewx, cnewx¯).
The adjustment is made whenever there is a change in consumption. We describe how
each new consumption level is determined in more detail in the main body of the paper.
1For example, consider a household who lives in Chicago and goes for a vacation within the U.S. once per
year. Suppose the family has a permanent increase in income and decides to visit Europe for a regular vacation
from this year. Our assumption implies that the household incurs search or learning costs when preparing to
visit a new place. We do not consider a monetary cost of search that should follow every consumption decision.
Rather, our model assumes that there is one time utility cost of searching or learning the new consumption
pattern when they increase the consumption level.
2In addition, the cost of upward adjustment is usually very small in our calibration exercise. We can set it
to be zero and generate the same resultf by slightly changing values of other variables.
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The optimal risky share is U-shaped in wealth for each (s, S) band. The risky asset
holdings consist of two components: the myopic component and the hedging component.
Noticing the minus sign in this decomposition, the hedging demand takes zero at the
boundaries of each (s, S) interval and the maximum value inside the interval. The reason
is to avoid a high utility cost that would be incurred if the household frequently adjusted
its consumption. Therefore, the risky share is U-shaped with the maximum at the one
of the boundaries, the minimum somewhere inside the interval. On the other hand,
naturally there is heterogeneity among households in utility costs as well as risk aversion.
Naturally arises the question of how to infer risk aversion of a certain household. We
define RCRRA (revealed coefficient of relative risk aversion) by risk aversion inferred by
the outsider observing the risky asset holdings of a household over time. Since the risky
share is time-varying, the RCRRA is time-varying. Moreover, the RCRRA is inverse
U-shaped inside the (s, S) boundary since the risky share is U-shaped.
Having the above properties in mind, our model can explain a number of interesting
implications for the household consumption and risky investment decisions. First, our
model can fill a gap between different views on risk aversion in the literature on decision
theory, structural estimation, behavioral, and asset pricing. Note that most asset pricing
models use the relative risk aversion coefficient of around 10 or higher for calibration exer-
cises to match asset pricing moments (e.g., Bansal et al. (2012), Cocco et al. (2005), and
references therein3). Along the similar lines, households usually hold 6 − 20% in equity
(conditional on participation, up to 40 %), which implies relative risk aversion is at least
10 or larger following calibration according to the standard models with widely accepted
market parameter values. On the contrary, the estimated individual relative risk aversion
takes values between 0.7 and 2 in decision theory, structural estimation, or behavioral
literature such as Bombardini and Trebbi (2012), Campo et al. (2011), Chetty (2006),
Gandelman and Hernndez-Murillo (2013, 2015), Hansen and Singleton (1982), Layard, Mayraz, and Nickel
(2008), and Szpiro (1986), among which more recent ones tend to claim that risk aversion
is less than 1 or around 1.
We show that time-varying risk aversion, i.e., RCRRA in our model is the same as
actual risk aversion only when the wealth process hits either one of (s, S) boundaries.
The set of these events, however, has measure zero for any stock price sample path.
The RCRRA is greater than actual risk aversion for most of times. We note that the
maximum value of RCRRA increases with the consumption adjustment costs (RCRRA is
always equal to risk aversion if there is no such cost). We show that the RCRRA takes
fairly high values closer to its maximum than actual risk aversion during the times when
the wealth process stays in the middle range of the (s, S) band and does not have high
fluctuation: These are times when the market is neither bullish nor bearish, rather has
small volatility for a while. This feature is in sharp contrast with that from traditional
3There are many other asset pricing models to suggest even much higher value than 10. For example,
Kandel and Stambaugh (1991) argues γ = 29.
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habit models since risk aversion in the habit models becomes higher only in downturns. For
example, Otrok et al. (2002) show that the size of equity premium in the traditional habit
model is determined by a relatively insignificant amount of high-frequency volatility in US
aggregate consumption. Moderate shocks have occurred in the world financial markets
over substantial time periods when the RCRRA takes high values in our model. Therefore,
our model can generate the average value of RCRRA consistent with that often used in
the asset pricing literature, while the coefficient of relative risk aversion is close to that
suggested by the behavioral or experimental literature.
Second, but more important is that the U-shaped risky share resulted from our model
has an interesting implication for the effect of the change of wealth on the risky share
on which the empirical literature looks inclusive. For example, Calvet et al. (2009) and
Calvet and Sodini (2014) favor habit, commitment, or DARA (decreasing relative risk
aversion) models predicting that the impact is positive, i.e., the risky share increases with
an increase in financial wealth. Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008) and Chiappori and Paiella
(2011), however, show no relationship (or slightly positive relationship, if any) between
the financial (liquid) wealth change and the risky share. We argue that both can happen
depending on which time-series is chosen. The U-shape implies that the risky share is
decreasing in wealth in the left side of (s, S) band and increasing in wealth in the right
side of (s, S) band (see Figure 10). The optimal wealth process tends to stay longer in
the increasing (decreasing) regions of each (s, S) interval over time if the market is such
that good shocks are more frequent than bad shocks (see Figure 3 and its description).
Thus, if good shocks occurred more frequently in the stock market during the data period,
the relationship tends to be positive. By using this intuition, we simulate four types of
sample paths: (a) bullish, (b) intermediate, (c) bearish, and (d) highly fluctuating. Then,
we regress the change of risky share on the change of financial wealth within each sample.
For cases (a) and (b), we find a significant positive impact of the wealth increase on the
risky share. Moreover, we find no or slightly negative relationship for cases (c) and (d).
Thus, our model can reconcile the discrepancy in the empirical literature.
Third, the optimal consumption process in our model features two well-documented
empirical regularities: the excess smoothness (Deaton, 1987) and the excess sensitivity
(Flavin, 1981). First, consumption tends not to respond to a permanent shock as long as
the shock does not push up or down the wealth level to one of the (s, S) boundaries, which
implies the excess smoothness. Second, suppose there is a good shock in the permanent
income. While this shock may not increase the current consumption level, it increases the
probability that consumption will increase in the future, by which the excess sensitivity
of consumption appears in our model. By the same reason, however, both the excess
smoothness and the excess sensitivity vanish for a large shock that immediately pushes
the wealth process up or down to either of the (s, S) boundaries. In other words, the
partial irreversibility of consumption in our model implies that consumption responds to
a large shock consistent with the permanent income hypothesis (Jappelli and Pistaferri
(2010)).
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Fourth, we explore asset pricing implications and find that our partial reversibility
model has a potential to well the U.S. data well. We follow Constantinides (1990) and
Marshall and Parekh (1999), simulate optimal consumption of individuals, and obtain a
simulated series of monthly aggregate consumption. We compute several moments such
as the consumption growth rate, the standard deviation of marginal rate of intertemporal
substitution, and the autocorrelation of consumption growth rate. We find that our model
matches better the US data than the traditional habit models.
Finally, our paper also makes a theoretical contribution to the literature of dynamic
optimization. We first transform the dynamic consumption and portfolio selection prob-
lem into a static one, and then derive the dual Lagrangian problem. The advantage of
solving the dual Lagrangian problem is that we do not need to consider the portfolio
choice and we are left to analyze two sided singular control problem (of consumption).
After each adjustment of consumption, the problem is to decide whether to increase or to
decrease consumption and if so, how much to change. Then, the original value function
is obtained from the convex duality relation. We characterize the full analytic solution.
The optimal portfolio can be derived from the dual value function by the convex duality
and Ito´’s lemma. The detail for each step is presented in the appendix.
1.1 Literature Review
Our paper is motivated from Duesenberry (1949). On one hand, the first part of his
critique quoted in the beginning of our introduction is closely related to external habit
formation and thus has significantly contributed to developing the modern habit models
such as Abel (1990), Constantinides (1990), and Campbell and Cochrane (1999). Some
of our results resemble those from habit model. For example, our model generates time-
varying risk aversion. However, ours are fundamentally different from habit models in that
the agent in habit models becomes more conservative when the current consumption level
gets closer to the habit stock (e.g., in downturns) while RCRRA in our model becomes
higher in times when the stock market is neither bullish nor bearis, but rather flat and
has low volatility. On the other hand, there is a handful of previous literature that grew
out from the second part of the critique such as Dybvig (1995) and Jeon et al. (2018).4
However, Dybvig (1995) and Jeon et al. (2018) assume that consumption decision is fully
irreversible (other than allowing a predetermined depreciation). Therefore, they are an
4Note that the second part of critique is well described as follows:
At any moment a consumer already has a well-established set of consumption habits... Suppose
a man suffers a 50 per cent reduction in his income and expects this reduction to be permanent.
Immediately after the change he will tend to act in the same way as before... In retrospect he will
regret some of his expenditures. In the ensuing periods the same stimuli as before will arise, but
eventually he will learn to reject some expenditures and respond by buying cheap substitutes for
the goods formerly purchased (Dusenberry 1949, p. 24).
5
extreme special case of our model.5 We better formulate the ratchet effect with partial
irreversibility by allowing costly downward adjustment, which generates the U-shape risky
share and its novel implications that Dybvig (1995) and Jeon et al. (2018) do not.
Our model is also related to dynamic consumption and investment models with durable
consumption or consumption commitment such as Grossman and Laroque (1990), Hindy and Huang
(1992, 1993), Hindy et al. (1997), Flavin and Nakagawa (2008), and Chetty and Szeidl
(2007, 2016). We view our model as complement to the consumption commitment lit-
erature. For example, Chetty and Szeidl (2016) show in the commitment model that
the excess smoothness and excess sensitivity arise for moderate shocks and they vanish
for large shocks. The same result holds from a different channel in our model, namely
through learning or adjustment costs. In our model there exist two different adjustment
costs, downward and upward adjustment costs. Thus magnitude of large shocks which
make immediate adjustment and individuals aggressive in risk taking is in general differ-
ent for good shock and for bad shocks. This paves a way for empirical test whether the
effects of large shock on consumption and risk taking are different for these two different
shocks. Furthermore, our model generalizes the models of consumption and portfolio se-
lection with durability and local substitution by Hindy and Huang (1992) and Hindy et al.
(1997) via the isomorphism discovered by Schroder and Skiadas (2002).
The rest of the paper continues as follows. Section 2 describes the model. 3 present the
analysis for the explicit solution. The implications of risky investment and consumption
are provided in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
We consider a simple and standard continuous-time financial market. The financial market
consists of two assets: a riskless asset and a risky asset. We assume that the risk-free
rate, the rate of return on the riskless asset, is constant and equal to r. The price St of
the risky asset or the market Index evolves as follows:
dSt/St = µdt+ σdBt,
where µ, σ are constants, µ > r, and Bt is a Brownian motion on a standard probability
space (Ω,F ,P)6 endowed with an augmented filtration {Ft}t≥0 generated by the Brownian
motion Bt.
The agent’s wealth process (Xt)
∞
t=0 evolves according to the following dynamics:
dXt = [rXt + pit(µ− r)− ct]dt+ σpitdBt, X0 = X > 0, (1)
5More precisely, Dybvig (1995) and Jeon et al. (2018) assume that consumption is not allowed to decrease.
The model converges to those of Dybvig (1995) and Jeon et al. (2018) if the cost of decreasing consumption
goes to infinite and the cost of increasing consumption is equal to zero in our model.
6See Karatzas and Shreve (1998) for details of mathematics and the probability theory.
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where ct ≥ 0 and pit are the consumption rate and the dollar amount invested in the risky
asset, respectively, at time t.
For non-negative constants α and β, the agent’s utility function is given by
U ≡ E
[∫ ∞
0
e−δt
(
u(ct)dt− αd(u(ct))
+ − βd(u(ct))
−
)]
, (2)
where δ > 0 is the subjective discount rate and u(·) is a twice-continuously differentiable,
strictly concave, and strictly increasing function. We decompose
u(ct) = u(c0) + u(ct)
+ − u(ct)
−,
where u(ct)
+ and u(ct)
− are non-decreasing processes. This decomposition is well-defined
if the consumption process ct is admissible (See Definition 2.1 and equation (4)). (2)
implies that the agent instantaneously loses the α or β unit of utility whenever there is
one unit increase or decrease in the marginal utility. The example of the first kind is the
utility cost of learning how to spend and that of the second is the point made by models
with “catching up with Joneses” such as Abel (1990), Constantinides (1990), Gali (1994)
and Campbell and Cochrane (1999).
In this paper, we assume the constant relative risk aversion(CRRA) utility function:
u(c) =
c1−γ
1− γ
, γ > 0, γ 6= 1, (3)
where γ is the agent’s risk coefficient of relative risk aversion.
To define the strategy set, we denote by Π the family of all ca´gla´d, Ft-adapted, non-
decreasing process with starting at 0 and assume that there exist c+, c− ∈ Π such that
the agent’s consumption ct can be expressed by
ct = c+ c
+
t − c
−
t , (4)
where c is the agent’s initial consumption rate. Then, the agent’s objective (2) is rewritten
as
U ≡ E
[∫ ∞
0
e−δt
(
u(ct)dt− αu
′(ct)dc
+
t − βu
′(ct)dc
−
t
)]
. (5)
We define the set of consumption and risky investment strategies as follows.
Definition 2.1. We call a consumption-portfolio plans (c+, c−, pi) admissible if
(a) A consumption strategy (c+, c−) satisfies
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−δt
(
|u(ct)|dt+ αu
′(ct)dc
+
t + βu
′(ct)dc
−
t
)]
<∞. (6)
We denote by Π(c) the class of all consumption strategies (c+, c−) satisfying the
condition (6).
(b) For all t ≥ 0, pit is measurable process with repsect to Ft satisfying∫ t
0
pi2sds < +∞, a.e. (7)
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(c) For all t ≥ 0, the wealth process is non-negative, i.e.,
Xt ≥ 0. (8)
The following assumption should be satisfied in order to guarantee the existence of
the special case of α = β = 0, i.e., the classical Merton problem.
Assumption 1.
K ≡ r +
δ − r
γ
+
γ − 1
2γ2
θ2 > 0.
If the agent instantaneously increases her consumption by a small amount, from c to
c+∆c between t and t+∆t, the intertemporal utility gain from the additional consump-
tion is
1
δ
(u(c+∆c)− u(c)) ≈
1
δ
u′(c)∆c. On the other hand, the utility loss from the
consumption increase is αu′(c)∆c. The gain should be greater than the loss. Otherwise,
the agent will never increase consumption in our model. This observation leads to the
following assumption.
Assumption 2.
0 ≤ δα < 1.
There is no parameter restriction for β ∈ [0,∞). The problem studied by Dybvig
(1995) is an extreme case of ours. Dybvig (1995) consider the case when α = 0 and
β →∞, which means there is no utility cost of increasing consumption and infinity utility
loss from decreasing consumption (i.e., ratcheting of consumption).
Now we state the problem as follows.
Problem 1 (Primal Problem (Dynamic Version)).
Given c0 = c > 0 and X0 = X > 0, we consider the following utility maximization
problem:
V (X, c) = sup E
[∫ ∞
0
e−δt
(
u(ct)dt− αu
′(ct)dc
+
t − βu
′(ct)dc
−
t
)]
(9)
where the supremum is taken over all admissible consumption/portfolio plans (c+, c−, pi)
subject to the wealth process (1).
Note that Problem 1 is subject to the dynamics budget constraint (1). In Section
3.1, we first transform Problem 1 into a static problem (Problem 2) by the well-known
method of linearizing the budget constraint suggested by Karatzas et al. (1987) and
Cox and Huang (1989). Finally we transform that static problem to a singular control
problem (Problem 3). Theorem 3.1 shows that the solution to Problem 1 is recovered
from the solution to Problem 3 by the duality relationship. We will obtain the solution
to Problem 3 and characterize optimal policies by using it in later sections. Note that the
advantages of dealing with the singular control problem in Problem 3 are described right
below the problem statement.
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3 Solution Analysis
3.1 The Problem Reformulation
In order to reformulate Problem 1, first we transform the wealth process satisfying (1)
into a static budget constraint. For this purpose we define, for t ≥ 0,
θ ≡
µ− r
σ
, ξt ≡ e
−rtZt, and Zt ≡ e
− 1
2
θ2t−θBt .
Let us define an equivalent measure Q by setting
dQ
dP
= ZT , (10)
so that the process BQt = Bt + θt is a standard Brownian motion under the measure Q.
Then, the wealth process (1) is changed by
dXt = [rXt − ct]dt+ σpitdB
Q
t . (11)
Applying Fatou’s lemma and Bayes’ rule to e−rtXt, we get the following static budget
constraint:
E
[∫ ∞
0
ξtctdt
]
≤ X. (12)
where X is the initial wealth level, i.e., X0 = X . Then, we restate Problem 1 as the
following problem.
Problem 2 (Primal Problem (Static Version)).
Given c0 = c > 0 and X0 = X > 0, we consider the following utility maximization
problem:
V (X, c) = sup E
[∫ ∞
0
e−δt
(
u(ct)dt− αu
′(ct)dc
+
t − βu
′(ct)dc
−
t
)]
(13)
where the supremum is taken over all admissible consumption/portfolio plans (c+, c−, pi)
subject to the static budget constraint (12).
By following Cox and Huang (1989) and Karatzas et al. (1987), it is easy to see that
the solution to Problem 1 is the same as that to Problem 2. Thus, henceforth the both
problems are called the primal problem in this paper.
Using the static budget constraint (12), we consider the following Lagrangian:
L =E
[∫ ∞
0
e−δt
(
u(ct)dt− αu
′(ct)dc
+
t − βu
′(ct)dc
−
t
)]
+ y
(
X − E
[∫ ∞
0
ξtctdt
])
=E
[∫ ∞
0
e−δt
(
(u(ct)− ye
δtξtct)dt− αu
′(ct)dc
+
t − βu
′(ct)dc
−
t
)]
+ yX,
(14)
where y > 0 is the Lagrange multiplier for the budget constraint. We define the process
yt = ye
δtξt, t ≥ 0
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which plays the role of the Lagrangemultiplier for the budget constraint at time t, and thus
(yt)
∞
t=0 represents the marginal utility(shadow price) of wealth process. We will describe
how the marginal utility of wealth process is related to the agent’s optimal consumption
policy.
Now we introduce the dual problem of Problem 1 or Problem 2:
Problem 3 (Dual problem).
J(y, c) = sup
(c+,c−)∈Π(c)
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−δt
(
(u(ct)− ytct)dt− αu
′(ct)dc
+
t − βu
′(ct)dc
−
t
)]
= sup
(c+,c−)∈Π(c)
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−δt
(
h(yt, ct)dt− αu
′(ct)dc
+
t − βu
′(ct)dc
−
t
)]
,
(15)
where
h(y, c) = u(c)− yc.
and Π(c) is the class of all consumption strategies (c+, c−) satisfying the condition (6).
Problem 3 is the optimization problem with singular controls over Π(c). There are two
advantages in dealing with the dual problem. The first advantage is that we do not need
to consider the portfolio choice. This property is, in fact, inherited from the formulation
of Problem 2. The second advantage is that now the agent’s problem becomes a singular
control problem of deciding either to increase or decrease the level of consumption given
the current consumption c. Therefore, we can apply a standard method of singular control
problem developed by Davis and Norman (1990) or Fleming and Soner (2006).
3.2 Solution: Dual Value Function
The dual value function J(y, c) satisfies the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman(HJB)
equation:
max{LJ(y, c) + u(c)− yc, Jc(y, c)− αu
′(c),−Jc − βu
′(c)} = 0, (y, c) ∈ R (16)
where R ≡ R+ × R+ and the differential operator L is given by
L =
θ2
2
y2
∂2
∂y2
+ (δ − r)y
∂
∂y
− δ.
To solve the HJB equation (16), we define the increasing region IR, the decreasing region
DR and the non-adjustment region NR as follows:
IR = {(y, c) ∈ R | Jc(y, c) = αu
′(c)},
NR = {(y, c) ∈ R | −βu′(c) < Jc(y, c) < αu
′(c)},
DR = {(y, c) ∈ R | Jc(y, c) = −βu
′(c)}.
(17)
In what follows in this subsection we describe the explicit form of the dual value function
in each region. First, as shown in Appendix A, the regions IR,NR andDR are rewritten
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by
IR = {(y, c) ∈ R | y ≤ u′(c)bα},
NR = {(y, c) ∈ R | u′(c)bα < y < u
′(c)bβ},
DR = {(y, c) ∈ R | u′(c)bβ ≤ y},
respectively. See Figure 1 for the graphical representation of each region. It is important
to characterize IR-, NR- and DR-regions in order to understand the optimal strategies,
which will be investigated in great detail in Section 3.3. Here, bα and bβ are given by
bα = (1− δα)
m1 − 1
m1
1
κ
wm1 − 1
wm1−1 − 1
> 0 and bβ = (1 + δβ)
m1 − 1
m1
wm1 − κ
wm1 − w
> 0
with κ =
1− δα
1 + δβ
. m1 and m2 are positive and negative roots of following quadratic
equation:
θ2
2
m2 + (δ − r −
θ2
2
)m− δ = 0.
Moreover, w is a unique solution to the equation f(w) = 0 in (0, 1), where
f(w) = (m1 − 1)m2(1− w
1−m2)(wm1 − κ)−m1(m2 − 1)(w
m1 − w)(1 − κw−m2). (18)
In the following proposition, we provide a solution to Problem 3.
Proposition 3.1. The dual value function J(y, c) of Problem 3 is given by
J(y, c) =

D1yc
(1− γ + γm1)bα
(
y
c−γbα
)m1−1
+
D2yc
(1− γ + γm2)bα
(
y
c−γbα
)m2−1
+
1
δ
c1−γ
1− γ
−
yc
r
, for (y, c) ∈ NR,
J
(
y, I(
y
bα
)
)
+ α
(
u(c)− u(I(
y
bα
))
)
, for (y, c) ∈ IR,
J
(
y, I(
y
bβ
)
)
− β
(
u(c) − u(I(
y
bβ
))
)
, for (y, c) ∈ DR,
(19)
where
D1 =
(α− 1
δ
)m2 + (m2 − 1)
bα
r
m2 −m1
, D2 =
(α− 1
δ
)m1 + (m1 − 1)
bα
r
m1 −m2
.
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix A.
Finally we summarize the duality relationship between the value function of the primal
problem and the dual value function of Problem 3 in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1. For the value function V (X, c) of Problem 1 and dual value function
J(y, c) of Problem 3, the following duality relationship is established:
V (X, c) = min
y>0
(J(y, c) + yX) . (20)
In addition, there exists a unique solution y∗ for the minimization problem (20).
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix B.
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3.3 Optimal strategies
0
✻
dual variable y
✲
marginal utility u′(c)
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
y = u′(c)bβ
✟✟
✟✟
✟✟
✟✟
✟✟
✟✟
✟✟
✟✟
✟✟
✟ y = u
′(c)bα
(DR-region)
(IR-region)
(NR-region)
✻
❄
(u′(c0), y0)
❄
✻
Figure 1: DR-region, NR-region, and IR-region
Refer Figure 1 for the graphical representation of the optimal consumption behavior.
If the initial consumption level c0 is such that y0/u
′(c0) lies in the increasing region IR
or the decreasing region DR, it jumps immediately to the non-adjustment region NR.
Suppose the level of consumption is such that y0/u
′(c0) lies inside the NR-region. The
level of consumption stays constant during the time yt-process lies inside the NR-region.
Consumption jumps down if and only if yt process hits u
′(c0)bβ and it jumps up if and
only if yt hits u
′(c0)bα. In this case, the question is how much the consumption level
jumps up or down. Proposition 3.2 explicitly characterizes the amount of the jump at
each time when there is a consumption adjustment.
Proposition 3.2. The optimal consumption c∗t for t ≥ 0 is given by
c∗t = c0 + c
∗,+
t − c
∗,−
t ,
where y∗t = y
∗eδtξt and y
∗ is the unique solution to the minimization problem (20) and
c∗,+t = max
{
0,−c0 + sup
s∈[0,t)
(
c∗,−s + I(
y∗s
bα
)
)}
,
c∗,−t = max
{
0, c0 + sup
s∈[0,t)
(
c∗,+s − I(
y∗s
bβ
)
)}
.
(21)
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix C.
Processes c∗,+t and c
∗,−
t are non-decreasing regulators such that y
∗
t /u
′(c∗t ) lies inside
the NR-region. c∗,+t and c
∗,−
t stay mostly constant. Consumption increases whenever
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Figure 2: Simulation of optimal consumption, y/u′(c∗), c∗,+ and c∗,− with α = 5, β = 10.
The other parameter values are as follows: ρ = 0.02, µ = 0.085, r = 0.015, σ = 0.25, γ =
2, X = 50, c = 1 and T = 80.
c∗,+t increases, but consumption decreases whenever c
∗,−
t increases. More precisely, as
seen in Figure 1, the process c∗,+t stays constant within the non-adjustment region NR
and increases if and only if y∗t /u
′(ct) hits the free boundary bα. Similarly, the process c
∗,−
t
also stays constant within the non-adjustment region NR. c∗,−t increases if and only if
y∗t hits the free boundary bβ. Figure 2 plots sample paths of c
∗,+
t and c
∗,−
t together with
those of
yt
u′(c∗t )
and c∗t . See Figure 2 for simulated paths of
yt
u′(c∗t )
, c∗,+t , c
∗,−
t , and c
∗
t .
Proposition 3.2 describes the consumption path according to the ratio of the shadow
price of wealth to the marginal utility process. Then, how is the consumption process
related to the agent’s wealth process? The following theorem provides the answer to this
question.
Theorem 3.2. Pick an arbitrary time s ≥ 0 and let c∗s = c be the optimal consumption
at s for some constant c > 0. For t ≥ s, the optimal consumption is fixed as c∗t = c
during the time in which yt is inside the NR region (by Proposition 3.2). In this case,
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the optimal wealth process X∗t follows
X∗t =
c
r
− c
(
D1m1
(1− γ + γm1)bα
(
y∗t
c−γbα
)m1−1
+
D2m2
(1 − γ + γm2)bα
(
y∗t
c−γbα
)m2−1)
.
(22)
In addition, there exist two positive numbers x and x¯ such that c∗t = c for t ≥ s if and
only if
x <
X∗t
c
< x¯ or cx < X∗t < cx¯. (23)
The explicit forms of x and x¯ are given in the proof.
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix D.
Suppose c∗s = c is the optimal consumption level at a certain time s as in Theorem
3.2. Equation (22) explicitly describes the optimal wealth process during the times when
the shadow value of wealth, yt-process stays inside the NR-region for t ≥ s.
The consumption level increases according to the first equation in (21) if and only if yt
hits the lower threshold u′(cs)bα or touches the IR-region. The latter part of Theorem 3.2
tells that this condition is equivalent to the case when X∗t hits the upper threshold cX¯ .
Conversely, the consumption level decreases according to the second equation in (21) if
and only if yt hits the upper threshold u
′(cs)bβ or touches the DR-region. This condition
is equivalent to the case when X∗t hits the lower threshold cx.
A B
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Add Bdd
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with cu > c0
Figure 3: A discrete example of wealth and consumption.
The optimal consumption policy looks like a (s, S) policy over wealth. Note that the
two threshold levels x and x¯ depend on the market parameter values and (α, β). Equation
(23) implies that for a given consumption c at a certain point of time, the thresholds are
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cx and cx¯. Once the agent’s wealth reaches either one of two thresholds of wealth, the
new consumption level c′ is determined by (21). Then, the two new thresholds levels are
set as c′x and c′x¯.
Figure 3 describes a discrete-time version of the wealth and consumption movement.
Assume that current wealth is X0 and consumption is c0. Initially the wealth process
lies in interval (A,B). Suppose Xt hits c0x¯ (point B) after several good shocks. Then,
a new consumption level is set as cu and the new (s, S) band is interval (Au, Bu). At
this instant, the wealth level is at point Bu. If a positive shock arrives again at point Bu,
a new consumption level is immediately set as cuu and the new (s, S) band is interval
(Auu, Buu). If a negative shock arrives at point Bu, however, Xt moves inside (Au, Bu)
and the consumption level stays at cu until Xt hits either cux (point Au) or cux¯ (point
Bu).
On the contrary, let us go back to the time when the wealth process lies in interval
(A,B). Suppose Xt hits c0x (point A) after several bad shocks. Then, a new consumption
level is set as cd and the new (s, S) band is interval (Ad, Bd). At this instant, the wealth
level is at point Ad. If a negative shock arrives again at point Ad, a new consumption
level is immediately set as cdd and the new (s, S) band is interval (Add, Bdd). If a positive
shock arrives at at point Ad, however, Xt moves inside (Ad, Bd) and the consumption
level stays at cu until Xt hits either cdx (point Ad) or cdx¯ (point Bd).
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Figure 4: Simulation of optimal consumption, wealth and portfolio with α = 5, β = 10. The
other parameter values are as follows: ρ = 0.02, µ = 0.085, r = 0.015, σ = 0.25, γ = 2,
X0 = 50, C0 = 1 and T = 80.
Now let us turn to the optimal risky investment, which is given in Proposition 3.3
below. The explicit form of the optimal portfolio in is easily obtained by applying Ito’s
lemma to the optimal wealth process in (22) and drawing out the corresponding term.
Figure 4 shows a simulated path of X∗t and plots its corresponding consumption and risky
portfolio. Notice from the figure that the number of portfolio rebalances is far more than
the number of consumption adjustment over time. In other words, the household keeps
rebalancing risky stock holdings within the (s, S) band while consumption is adjusted
only at the boundary.
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Proposition 3.3. Let c∗s = c be the optimal consumption level at time s for some constant
c. The optimal portfolio pi∗t is given by
pi∗t =
θ
σ
c
(
D1m1(m1 − 1)
(1− γ + γm1)bα
(
y∗t
c−γbα
)m1−1
+
D2m2(m2 − 1)
(1− γ + γm2)bα
(
y∗t
c−γbα
)m2−1)
(24)
for t ≥ s before the next consumption adjustment happens.
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix E.
Based on the classical portfolio selection results, we can easily see that the optimal
risky portfolio in Equation (24) in Proposition 3.3 (a) will be decomposed as follows:
pi∗t =
µ− r
γσ2
X∗t −
(
µ− r
γσ2
X∗t − pi
∗
t
)
or
pi∗t
X∗t
=
µ− r
γσ2
−
(
µ− r
γσ2
−
pi∗t
X∗t
)
. (25)
The first term is a myopic term and the remaining term is a hedging term. Note the
minus sign in front of the second term. Intuitively, the second term in (25) is the demand
that crows out the myopic demand, in order to maintain the current consumption level
since frequent changes of the consumption level incur high utility cost. In this sense, the
second term itself is positive. As seen in Panel (b) of Figure 5, the risky share is U-shaped
and the ratio of the hedging demand takes the largest value at the certain point inside
the (s, S) band at which the total risky share takes the minimum value, which generates
interesting implications. We will discuss the implications of the U-shaped risky share over
time in Section 4 (e).
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Figure 5: Parameter value are as follows : δ = 0.02, r = 0.015, µ = 0.085, σ = 0.25, γ = 2,X =
50, c = 1, α = 5, β = 100. In this case, x = 23.93 and x¯ = 72.82. In particular, Xˆ = 42.70 in
panel (c). The maximum RCRRA value is 4.1712.
While decomposition (25) is intuitive, putting (24) into (25) is complicated and thus
it is not much informative. In order to better understand risky investment pattern, we
define the revealed coefficient of relative risk aversion (RCRRA) as follows:
RCRRA(t) ≡
µ− r
σ2
X∗t
pi∗t
. (26)
The RCRRA is the level of relative risk aversion inferred from the agent’s portfolio allo-
cation at time t by outsiders who does not know the agent’s actual risk aversion. If the
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agent is unconstrained (α = β = 0, i.e., the Merton case), the RCRRA is always the same
as the agent’s true relative risk aversion γ. However, in general RCRRA is time-varying.
In fact, it has maximum and minimum values as shown in Theorem 3.3. The next the-
orem provides the properties of RCRRA and confirms the above intuition regarding the
hedging demand.
Theorem 3.3. (a) RCRRA(t) ≥ γ for all t ≥ 0.
(b) Pick any s ≥ 0. Consider the wealth process X∗t ∈ (cx, cx¯) for t ≥ s, where c
∗
s = c
is the optimal consumption level at time s for some constant c. Then, RCRRA(t)
approaches γ as X∗t approaches either cx or cx¯. Moreover, there exist Xˆ ∈ (cx, cx¯)
such that RCRRA attains the maximum at Xt = Xˆ. RCRRA decreases in wealth
for X∗t ∈ (cx, Xˆ) and increases in wealth for X
∗
t ∈ (Xˆ, cx¯).
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix F.
Panle (c) of Figure 5 plots a typical RCRRA as a function of wealth. RCRRA is
hump-shaped, which is opposite to the U-shaped risky share in Panel (b). It attains
the minimum value γ at the two ends of interval [cx, cx¯] and the maximum value at
Xˆ ∈ (cx, cx¯). As described in Theorem 3.3(b), RCRRA increases in wealth when the
wealth level is smaller than Xˆ and it decreases in wealth when the wealth level is greater
than Xˆ.
4 Risk Attitude and Risky Share
This section investigate the properties of the optimal risky investment policy obtained in
Section 3.3 in detail.
4.1 The consumption partial irreversibility model can explain the
puzzle why the risky share of households is low
A puzzle in the classical dynamic portfolio selection literature is that while households
usually hold 6−20% in equity (conditional on participation, up to 40%), standard models
predicts much higher values. For example, see the first row of Table 1 that is the Merton
case with CRRA preference with about 7% risk premium and 25% volatility. The risky
share is fairly high such as 124% and 75% when γ = 0.9 and 1.5, respectively, while these
values fall into the reasonable range of risk aversion estimated by the recent literature
(see the first paragraph of Section 4.2).
The optimal risky share in our case is not constant, but is U-shaped (or V-shaped)
(see Panel (b) in Figure 5 or Panels (b) and (d) in Figure 6). The maximum value of the
ratio of risky asset holdings is the same as that of the Merton case only when the wealth
process hits the (s, S) boundary. But, it is a measure zero event in a sample path. In
most of times, the risky share is strictly smaller as seen in Figure 5(b). As we will discuss
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γ = 0.9 γ = 1.5 γ = 3.5 γ = 6 γ = 10
(α, β) = (0, 0) 124% 75% 32% 19% 11%
(α, β) = (5, 10) 100% – 124% 55% – 75% 24% – 32% 11% – 19% 9% – 11%
(α, β) = (25, 100) 48% – 124% 27% – 75% 14% – 32% 9% – 19% 6% – 11%
(α, β) = (49, 100) 15% – 124% 9% – 75% 6% – 32% 4% – 19% 2% – 11%
Table 1: The risky share for different values of (α, β)′s: the first row corresponds to the
standard Merton case. The other parameters values are δ = 0.02, r = 0.015, µ = 0.085, and
σ = 0.25.
in Section 4.4, the ratio of risky asset holdings tends to be close to the minimum levels
in times when there are moderate shocks and the wealth fluctuation is also moderate
(equivalently, the RCRRA tends to be high for those times). For example, a household
with γ = 1.5 and (α, β) = (49, 100) may keep the risky share close to 9% for a long time
if only moderate good and bad shocks alternates in the market for the same period time.
The ratio gradually increases as the wealth process gradually increases since the equity
premium is positive. However, as mentioned before, 75% ratio happens fairly infrequently
and the ratio should be much lower than 75% for most of times. This means that the
utility cost model can generate the household portfolio holdings consistent with the data
from a plausible level of risk aversion (on which will be discussed in Section 4.2 below).
4.2 Time-varying risk attitude in our model can reconcile the gap
among the risk aversion parameter values widely used in different
literature
There is a vast literature on measuring risk aversion. The most widely accepted values are
between 0.7 and 2. More recent literature tends to argue that risk aversion is close to 1
or even less than 1 (For example, see Chetty (2006), Layard, Mayraz, and Nickel (2008),
Bombardini and Trebbi (2012), and Gandelman and Hernndez-Murillo (2015)).
Actual Risk aversion γ = 0.9 γ = 1.05 γ = 1.15 γ = 1.3 γ = 1.5
(α, β) (40,10000) (40,6000) (40,4500) (40,3200) (40, 2200)
(α, β) (45,5000) (45,3000) (45,2200) (45,1500) (45, 1100)
(α, β) (49,1000) (49,500) (49,400) (49,260) (49, 180)
Table 2: Actual risk aversion and the calibrated (α, β)′s to generate RCRRA with maximum
13: The other parameters values are δ = 0.02, r = 0.015, µ = 0.085, σ = 0.25,X = 50, and
c = 1.
However, most of asset pricing literature takes the level of risk aversion as about 10 or
higher for the calibration analysis (e.g., Bansal et al. (2012), and Cocco et al. (2005)). If
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we consider the investment aspect of these asset pricing models, it is related to the point
made in Section 4.1 in the sense that γ = 10 results in the risky share consistent with
the empirical observation for households’ stock holdings (see the column for γ = 10 when
(α, β) = (0, 0) in Table 1).
In summary, the estimated results directly tell that risk aversion is small around unity
while the calibration exercise in asset pricing indicates that the plausible level of risk
aversion should be much higher. Our model can reconcile the gap in these two lines of
literature. Table 2 shows our numerical exercises. It calibrates (α, β) values that generate
13 as the maximumRCRRA for each risk aversion around unity with other widely accepted
market parameter values given in the table.
Note that the conventional habit model can also generate time-varying risk aversion.
However, it requires to define a internal or external habit stock process, which are usually
ad hoc. Our model can perform a precise calibration analysis that can fit the maximum
and minimum values of risk aversion.
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Figure 6: Panels (a) and (c) plot RCRRA curves for shares for different α and β values.
Panels (b) and (d) plot the corresponding risky share, respectively. Other parameter values
are as follows: δ = 0.02, r = 0.015, µ = 0.085, σ = 0.25, c = 1 and γ = 1.5.
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(α, β) σ = 0.25 σ = 0.3 σ = 0.35 σ = 0.4
(5, 10) 1.116 1.164 1.208 1.249
(5, 100) 1.782 1.974 2.164 2.358
(29, 100) 2.502 2.866 3.250 3.668
(49, 100) 7.459 9.607 12.40 16.07
(49, 1000) 13.18 18.48 26.20 37.46
Table 3: The maximum values of RCRRA. The other parameters values are δ = 0.02, r =
0.015, µ = 0.085, γ = 0.9, X = 50, and c = 1.
4.3 RCRRA can be very large while actual risk aversion is small
In Figure 5(c), the actual risk aversion is γ = 3 and the maximum value of RCRRA is
about 5.32. This difference does not seem large. However, the difference between the
actual level of risk aversion and the RCRRA value can be dramatically large. Figures 7
and 8 plot a sample path of RCRRA(t). While the actual risk aversion level is γ = 0.9 in
these figures, RCRRA can take more than 38. The optimal wealth path touches neither
cx nor cx¯ (See the left panel in each figure), which means that the consumption path
stays constant in Figures 7 and 8.
The maximum value of RCRRA increases in α and β, respectively7 (see Table 3). A
high α or β implies a high cost when the agent changes the consumption level. Therefore,
the intertemporal hedging deman become large (with negative sign) to crow out the myopic
demand (see Eq. (25) and explanation below the equation), which makes the RCRRA
level higher. In addition, a high risk, i.e., a high volatility σ increase the maximum level
of RCRRA by the same token.
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Figure 7: RCRRA can be very large while the actual risk aversion is very low (γ = 0.9).
Consumption stays constant in this sample path. Parameter values are as follows: δ =
0.02, r = 0.015, µ = 0.085, σ = 0.4, T = 80,X = 64.38, c = 1, α = 49, β = 1000. The
maximum RCRRA value is 37.46.
7Note that β is more important since α cannot exceed 1
δ
because of Assumption 2.
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Figure 8: RCRRA can be very large while the actual risk aversion is very low (γ = 0.9).
Consumption stays constant in this sample path. Parameter values are as follows: δ =
0.02, r = 0.015, µ = 0.085, σ = 0.4, T = 80,X = 64.38, c = 1, α = 49, β = 1000. The
maximum RCRRA value is 37.46.
4.4 RCRRA tends to be large during the times when moderate
shocks continuously arrive. RCRRA becomes small for the times
with large shocks.
We know that RCRRA can be very large while the given risk aversion is very small.
Then, when does it happen? In habit models, it happens in the downturns, in particular,
when the current consumption level is very close to the habit stock. The mechanism to
induce the difference between the actual risk aversion and the RCRRA in our model is
very different from that of habit models.
Notice in our model that RCRRA tends to be small during the times when there are
consecutive large shocks and thus in these times there are high fluctuations in wealth. For
example, those times are between t = 45 and t = 60 in Figure 7 and between t = 20 and
t = 50 in Figure 8. On the other hand, it tends to be high during the time when there
are little or modest fluctuations in wealth due to moderately alternating good and bad
shocks. For example, those times are before t = 45 in Figure 7 and after t = 50 in Figure
8. There are other examples in the Appendix.
In other words, high cost for consumption adjustment amplifies risk aversion over
small or moderate shocks (particularly during the times when the wealth level stays in
the mid range of (s, S) band), making the household look very conservative. However,
the household may look very aggressive (if her actual risk aversion is very low), showing
RCRRA close to her actual risk aversion, during the time when there are large shocks.
Notably, if the household has a long sequence of moderate good shocks, then the risk
aversion gradually decreases (equivalently the household gradually increases risky asset
holdings). This pattern looks like that the household gains more confidence due to the
success in the stock market.
In this sense, our utility cost model can generate substantial risk aversion in times of
moderate risk events and great risk-taking in times of large risk events. This result is
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quite consistent with the puzzle reported in the behavioral literature.
4.5 Change in risky share relative to change in wealth
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Figure 9: Four different cases of stock price evolution: Parameter value are as follows :
δ = 0.02, r = 0.015, µ = 0.085, σ = 0.25, γ = 1.5 and c = 1.
Here we investigate how the risky share changes relative to an increase in wealth. Note
that models with habit, commitment, or DRRA (decreasing relative risk aversion) often
predict that the relationship is positive while standard models with CRRA preference
predicts no relationship. The empirical literature, however, seems rather inconclusive. For
example, Calvet et al. (2009) and Calvet and Sodini (2014) favor the habit or commitment
or DRRA models, and Chiappori and Paiella (2011) and Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008)
favor the classical CRRA model and show even slightly negative relationship. We shed
on light on the debate in the literature. We argue that whether the change in wealth
has positive, negative, or no impact on the risky share depends on what kind of a sample
path (time-series of the stock market data) researchers use although the data generating
process is fixed.
Figure 9 shows the four types of sample paths we consider. Panel (a) is a typical
long-term bull market, , Panel (b) is intermediate, Panel (c) is a typical bear market, and
Panel (d) is the highly-fluctuating market over time. We will show that the impact of an
wealth change on the risky share is different for each sample path. To do so, we generate
the population with random (α, β)′s and simulate their wealth and risky share over time.
Basically our estimation analysis follows that of Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008). Con-
sider the following equation
∆k log
pit
Xt
= ρ∆k logXt, (27)
where ∆k denotes a k-period(year) first-difference operator, ∆kyt ≡ yt − yt−k. Below we
briefly explain how we regress Eq. (27).
(Step 1) Generate initial consumption/wealth distributions of N individuals.
• We divide the interval [0, T ] into 12×T subintervals with end points tj = 1, 2, ..., 12×
T . (Here, we assume that T is a positive integer)
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• We set equal initial consumption, c0 = 1 for each individual and generate each
individual’s initial consumption x0 randomly according to a uniform distribution
over (cx, cx¯).
• For each i, i = 1, 2, ...N and given pairs (mα, vα), (mβ , vβ), we generate log-normally
distributed random variables αi and βi whose the mean and variance are (mα, vα)
and (mβ , vβ), respectively.
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• Generate a 12 × T random vector ω that follows a standard normal distribution.
Using this vector ω, we generate the process of the risky asset returns ∆St/St, and
the dual process y∗t in Proposition 3.2 for all the N individuals. By Proposition 3.2,
we can simulate the optimal wealth and portfolio processes of N individuals.
(Step 2) Compute changes in the ratio of risk asset holdings and changes in wealth.
• Let (X1, P 1), (X2, P 2), ..., (XN , PN) be the simulated wealth/portfolio processes for
N individuals in our utility cost model obtained in (Step 1). (Note that X i and
P i are (12× T + 1) random vectors for i = 1, 2, ..., N).
• For given T and k, there are (T − k + 1) numbers of ∆k.
For i = 1, 2, ..., N and j = 1, 2, ..., (T − k + 1)
DR(i, j) = ∆k log
P ij+k
Xij+k
= log
P i(12× (j + k − 1) + 1)
Xi(12× (j + k − 1) + 1)
− log
P i(12× (j − 1) + 1)
Xi(12× (j − 1) + 1)
,
X(i, j) = ∆k logX
i
j+k = logX
i(12× (j + k − 1) + 1) − logXi(12× (j − 1) + 1).
• We regress Eq. (27) with OLS using the simulate results DR and X .
(mα, vα) (mβ, vβ) bull markets intermediate bear markets highly fluctuating
(5, 52) (50, 202) 0.1369∗∗∗ 0.0208 (0.22) −0.0757∗∗∗ −0.0679∗∗∗
(10, 52) (100, 202) 0.0999∗∗∗ 0.0829∗∗∗ −0.0746∗∗∗ −0.0699∗∗∗
(10, 52) (150, 502) 0.1107∗∗∗ 0.1261∗∗∗ -0.0478 (0.01) -0.0271 (0.26)
(15, 102) (150, 502) 0.1118∗∗∗ 0.1229∗∗∗ -0.0387 (0.04) -0.0341 (0.17)
(15, 102) (200, 502) 0.0961∗∗∗ 0.1710∗∗∗ -0.0164 (0.43) -0.0379 (0.14)
N = 1500, T = 5, k = 2.
Table 4: The regression coefficients for markets (a), (b), (c), and (d) in Figure 9: We generate
the distribution of households with α and β using the log-normal distributions with mean mα,
mβ and variance vα, vβ respectively. The values in the parentheses are p-values when the
p-value is greater than 1%. ∗ ∗ ∗ means the p-value smaller than 1%. The other parameters
values are δ = 0.02, r = 0.015, µ = 0.085, γ = 1.5, and c = 1.
The results are summarized in Table 4. The regression results show the positive impact
of the wealth increase on the risky share when the market is generally going up (Panel
8The log-normal distribution implies that there are households having fairly large values of α’s although
their density in the population is very small. We drop those household whose α values violates Assumption 2.
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(a)) or intermediate with moderate up-and-downs. There is no wealth impact on the risky
share or slightly negative (if any) when the market is generally going down (Panel (c)) or
has a huge volatility (Panel (d)). The intuition behind these results originates from the
decreasing
  region
increasing
  region
Figure 10: The decreasing region and increasing region of the risky share in the (s, S) band.
ratio of risky asset holding dynamics and wealth process. The risky share is hump-shaped
in each (s, S) band, which implies that there are two regions with the band: the one
is the decreasing region in which the risky share decreases with wealth and the other is
the increasing region in which the risky share increases with wealth (see Figure 10). The
decreasing region is in the left part of the (s, S) band and the increasing region is in the
right part of the (s, S) band. In general, the increasing region longer than the decreasing
region since the risk premium is positive. In addition, recall Figure 3 and its description
below Theorem 3.2. In Figure 3, if there are consecutive good shocks, the wealth process
tends to move in the following way: X0 → B → Bu → Buu. During the times of this
journey, the wealth process will stay longer in the increasing region of each (s, S) band
since there are more good shocks than bad shocks in size and amount. On the other hand,
if there are consecutive bad shocks, the wealth process tends to move in the other way:
X0 → A → Ad → Add. During the times of this journey, the wealth process will stay
longer in the decreasing region of each (s, S) band since there are more bad shocks than
good shocks.
Having the above property in mind, if the market is doing well in the long-run as in
Panel (a) of Figure 9), over time the wealth process is more likely to stay in the increasing
region of each (s, S) band. Thus, the risky share tends to increase with wealth during
these times. On the other hand, if the market is doing poorly for a while as in Panel (c)
of Figure 9), the wealth process is more likely to stay in the decreasing region of each (s,
S) interval. Thus, the risky share decreases with wealth during these times.
The intermediate case (Panel (b) of Figure 3) tends to be closer to the case of the bull
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market and the highly fluctuating period (Panel (d)) of 3) tends to be closer to the case of
the bear market. It is because, as mentioned above, the right half part of the (s, S) band
(increasing region) is generally longer than left half part of the (s, S) band (decreasing
region).
5 Consumption and Asset Pricing Moments
Here we provide two implications of optimal consumption. Our model can explain the
excess sensitivity and excess smoothness puzzles. In addition, our model can generate
the reasonable asset pricing moments such as auto-correlation coefficient of consumption,
which is often pointed out as a weakness of habit models.
5.1 Excess Sensitivity and Excess Smoothness
The optimal consumption level is infrequently adjusted in our model (see, for example,
Figures 4 and 5). The excess smoothness appears since consumption in our model does
not immediately respond to a permanent shock with a moderate level when the wealth
level after the shock does not reach the (s, S) boundary. In other words, the household is
less likely to change a consumption level with response to a small unexpected permanent
shock (income), while they do increase or decrease the ratio of risky asset holdings for a
positive (negative) shock.
The excess sensitivity also arises in our model by a similar reason. After a moderate
good shock, the wealth level becomes higher than before. Although consumption does not
immediately respond, it is more likely to increase later since the probability of increasing
consumption in the next period becomes higher after the good shock. Therefore, our
model can explain the excess sensitivity puzzle.
However, all the above arguments do not really work if the size of shock is large enough.
For a large good shock, the wealth level immediately reaches the upper threshold, which
makes consumption increase immediately. By the same token, the consumption level
decreases immediately after a large bad shock. So, the consumption moves in the large
shock events, following the permanent income hypothesis.
5.2 Auto-correlation
Here we provide how the model can generate consumption data and try to match several
asset pricing moments. By using the time series of aggregate consumption we compute the
mean and standard deviation of consumption growth rates, the intertemporal marginal
rate of substitution(IMRS) and the theoretical equity premium(EP). Based on our con-
sumption model, we simulate optimal consumption processes for N = 100 individuals
following three steps:
(Step 1) Generate initial consumption/wealth distributions of N individuals.
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E[∆c] σ(∆c) EP Std of IMRS AC1(∆c)
Data 0.0192 0.0212 – – 0.4600
Our Model 0.0181 0.0236 0.0052 0.0775 0.4900
Merton with temporal
aggregation
0.0200 0.0858 0.0526 0.2996 0.1677
Table 5: Mean, standard deviation, autocorrelation of the consumption growth rate, theoret-
ical equity premium, and standard deviation of the IMRS. The parameter values as follows:
δ = 0.015, r = 0.0086, µ = 0.0784, σ = 0.2016, γ = 3.5, and α = 5, β = 10. The data in the
first row is from Bansal et al. (2012), sampled on an annual frequency with the period from
1930 to 2008.
• We divide the interval [0, 79] into 2 × 12 × 79 subintervals with end points tj =
1, .., 2× 12× 79.
• Similar to Marshall and Parekh (1999), we set equal initial consumption, c0 = 1
for each individual and generate each individual’s initial consumption x0 randomly
according to a uniform distribution over (cx, cx¯).
• Generate a 2×12×79 random vector ω that follows a standard normal distribution.
Using this vector ω, we generate the process of the risky asset returns ∆St/St, and
the dual process y∗t in Proposition 3.2 for all the N individuals. By Proposition 3.2,
we can simulate the optimal consumption processes of N individuals.
(Step 2) Aggregation of Consumption
• Let C1, C2, ..., CN be the simulated consumption processes for N individuals in our
utility cost model obtained in (Step 1).
• (Cross sectional aggregation) The cross sectionally aggregated consumption process
CA of C1, C2, ..., CN is defined as follows:
For j = 1, 2, ..., 2× 12× 79,
CA(tj) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
ci(tj).
• (Temporal aggregation) We temporally aggregate the cross sectionally aggregated
series CA to create monthly CA∗ (that is, ∆t = 1/12) as follows:
For j = 1, 2, ..., 12× 79,
CA∗(i) =
2∑
j=1
CA(t2×(i−1)+j).
(Step 3) Compute the consumption growth rate, IMRS, and theoretical EP of aggregated
consumption CA∗
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δ γ α β E[∆c] σ(∆c) EP Std of IMRS AC1(∆c)
0.015 3.5 5
10 0.0181 0.0236 0.0052 0.0775 0.4900
15 0.0182 0.0232 0.0050 0.0758 0.4888
20 0.0183 0.0229 0.0049 0.0747 0.4881
0.015 3.5
0
20
0.0182 0.0233 0.0050 0.0762 0.4889
5 0.0183 0.0229 0.0049 0.0747 0.4881
10 0.0184 0.0226 0.0048 0.0736 0.4869
0.015 3.5
30 100 0.0191 0.0217 0.0044 0.0699 0.4825
50 100 0.0192 0.0215 0.0044 0.0693 0.4808
50 1000 0.0192 0.0215 0.0044 0.0691 0.4802
0.010
3.5 5 10
0.0194 0.0242 0.0054 0.0791 0.4888
0.015 0.0181 0.0236 0.0052 0.0775 0.4900
0.050 0.0093 0.0204 0.0039 0.0683 0.4953
0.015
0.9
5 10
0.0738 0.0963 0.0052 0.0775 0.4889
1.5 0.0431 0.0563 0.0052 0.0775 0.4898
3.5 0.0181 0.0236 0.0052 0.0775 0.4900
10 0.0063 0.0082 0.0052 0.0775 0.4900
Table 6: Mean, standard deviation, autocorrelation of the consumption growth rate, theoret-
ical equity premium, and standard deviation of the IMRS. The parameter values as follows:
r = 0.0086, µ = 0.0784 and σ = 0.2016.
• We use the simulated returns on the risky asset r(tj) = 1, 2, ..., 12× 79.
• We derive the following time-series
i = 1, 2, ..., 12× 79− 1,
(Consumption growth rate) CG(i) =
CA∗(i+ 1)− CA∗(i)
CA∗(i)
.
(IMRS) I(i) = e−δ∆t
(
CA∗(i+ 1)
CA∗(i)
)−γ
.
(EP) EP (i) = −
cov
(
e−δ∆t(CA∗(i+ 1)/CA∗(i))−γ , (r(i + 1)/r(i))
)
E[e−δ∆t(CA∗(i+ 1)/CA∗(i))−γ ]
.
Using these time-series, we obtain desired statistics(the mean and the standard
derivation of consumption growth, the IMRS, the theoretical EP and the auto-
correlation of aggregated consumption CA∗).
Since each time-series depends on the random vector ω, repeat (Step 1)–(Step 3) 1000
times.
The baseline results are summarized in Table 5. The model fits the consumption
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data well with reasonable values for the market and preference parameters. In particular,
the auto-correlation simulated by our model is well matched with the data, which is not
possible with the standard Merton case. It is surprising that a fairly small values of (α, β)
can generate the autocorrelation value close to its historical data. Table 6 confirms this
result.
6 Concluding Remarks
We model the partial irreversibility of consumption decision motivated by Duesenberry
(1949). In order to do so, we introduce the adjustment cost of consumption. We show that
the consumption partial irreversibility model can generate a number of novel implications.
Some of our results are similar to those derived from habit formation or consumption
commitment models. However, the mechanism to generate time-varying risk aversion or
the excess sensitivity and excess smoothness consumption is very different from that from
these literature. In this sense, we view that our model as complement to the existing
literature. In addition to these results, we find that the consumption adjustment cost can
reconcile the gap between the asset pricing literature and the literature on estimating risk
aversion. Also, we shed light on the debate on how the wealth change has impact on the
households risky share.
We believe that the (partial) irreversibility is a very realistic and important aspect of
consumption decision. While we model it by introducing the adjustment cost, we admit
that there would be other ways to model it. We hope that our model contributes to
building other works toward this direction. One of important future works will be building
a general equilibrium model with the partial irreversibility of consumption decision that
can investigate further asset pricing implications (e.g., Choi et al. (2018)). This type of
extension will help to provide the microfoundation for the relative income hypothesis by
Duesenberry (1949).
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Appendix
A Derivation of the dual value function J(y, c)
In this section, we will derive a solution to Problem 3 by solving the HJB equation (16).
The following theorem guarantees that the solution to the HJB equation (16) is the solution
to the dual problem.
Theorem A.1 (Verification Theorem).
1. Suppose that the HJB equation (16) has a twice continuously differentiable solution J(y, c) :
R → R satisfying the following conditions:
(1) For any admissible consumption strategy (c+, c−), the process defined by∫ t
0
e−δs(−θ)ysJy(ys, cs)dBs, t ≥ 0,
is a martingale.
(2) For any admissible consumption strategy (c+, c−),
lim inf
t→∞
E[e−δtJ(yt, ct)] ≥ 0.
Then, for initial condition (y0, c0) ∈ R and any admissible consumption strategy (c
+, c−),
J(y0, c0) ≥ E
[∫ ∞
0
e−δt
(
h(yt, ct)dt− αu
′(ct)dc
+
t − βu
′(ct)dc
−
t
)]
.
2. Given any initial condition (y, c) ∈ R, suppose that there exist an admissible consumption
strategy (c∗,+, c∗,−) such that, if c∗ is the associated consumption process, then
(yt, c
∗
t ) ∈ {(y, c) ∈ R : LJ(y, c) + h(y, c) = 0} ,
Lebesgue-a.e., P-a.s.,∫ t
0
e−δs
(
Jc(ys, c
∗
s)− αu
′(c∗s)
)
dc∗,+s = 0, for all t ≥ 0, P− a.s.,∫ t
0
e−δs
(
−Jc(ys, c
∗
s)− βu
′(c∗s)
)
dc∗,−s = 0, for all t ≥ 0, P− a.s,
(28)
and
lim
t→∞
E
[
e−δtJ(yt, c
∗
t )
]
= 0 (Transversality condition).
Then, J(y, c) is the dual value function for Problem 3 and (c∗,+, c∗,−) is the optimal consumption
strategy.
Proof. (Proof of 1.)
For given consumption process {ct}
∞
t=0, define a process
Mct =
∫ t
0
e−δs
(
(u(cs)− yscs)ds)− αu
′(cs)dc
+
t − βu
′(cs)dc
−
t
)
+ e−δtJ(yt, ct). (29)
By the generalized Ito´’s lemma (See Harrison (1985)),
dMct =e
−δt(u(ct)− ytct)dt− αu
′(ct)dc
+
t − βu
′(ct)dc
−
t +
(
e−δtdJ(yt, ct)− e
−δtδJ(yt, ct)dt
)
=e−δt
(
θ2
2
y2t Jyy(yt, ct) + (δ − r)ytJy(yt, ct)− δJ(yt, ct) + u(ct)− ytct
)
dt
+e−δt(Jc(yt, ct)− αu
′(ct))d(c
+
t )
c + e−δt(−Jc(yt, ct)− βu
′(ct))d(c
−
t )
c
+e−δt(J(yt, ct)− J(yt, ct−)− αu
′(ct)∆ct)1{∆ct>0}
+e−δt(J(yt, ct)− J(yt, ct−) + βu
′(ct)∆ct)1{∆ct<0} − θe
−δtytJy(yt, ct)dBt
(30)
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where (c+)c and (c−)c are the continuous parts of c+ and c−, respectively.
Hence, for any fixed T > 0,
McT −M
c
t =
∫ T
t
e−δs
(
θ2
2
y2sJyy(ys, cs) + (δ − r)ysJy(ys, cs)− δJ + u(cs)− yscs
)
ds︸ ︷︷ ︸
(A)
+
∫ T
t
(
Jc(ys, cs)− αu
′(cs)
)
d(c+s )
c +
∫ T
t
(
−Jc(ys, cs)− βu
′(cs)
)
d(c−s )
c
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(B)
+
∑
t≤s≤T
e−δs
(
J(ys, cs)− J(ys, cs−)− αu
′(cs)∆cs
)
1{∆cs>0}︸ ︷︷ ︸
(C)
+
∑
t≤s≤T
e−δs
(
J(ys, cs)− J(ys, cs−) + βu
′(cs)∆cs
)
1{∆cs<0}︸ ︷︷ ︸
(D)
+
∫ T
t
(−θ)e−δsysJy(ys, cs)dBs︸ ︷︷ ︸
(E)
.
(31)
Since
max{LJ + u(c)− yc, Jc(y, c)− αu
′(c),−Jc(y, c)− βu
′(c)} = 0,
we deduce that
(A) ≤ 0 and (B) ≤ 0.
Moreover,
(C) =
∑
t≤s≤T
e−δs
∫ cs
cs−∆cs
(
Jc(ys, cs)− αu
′(c)
)
dc · 1{∆cs>0} ≤ 0,
(D) =
∑
t≤s≤T
e−δs
∫ |∆cs|
0
(
−Jc(ys, cs − |∆cs|+ c)− βu
′(c)
)
dc · 1{∆cs<0} ≤ 0,
(32)
and by assumption, E[(E)] = 0.
Thus, we can conclude that
Et[M
c
T −M
c
t ] ≤ 0,
and {Mct }t≥0 is a super-martingale.
This implies that E[McT ] ≤ J(y0, c0) and
J(y0, c0) ≥ E
[∫ T
0
e−δs
(
(u(cs)− yscs)ds)− αu
′(cs)dc
+
t − βu
′(cs)dc
−
t
)]
+ e−δTJ(yT , cT ). (33)
By assumption
lim inf
T→∞
E[e−δTJ(yT , cT )] ≥ 0.
and Fatou’s lemma, we deduce that
J(y0, c0) ≥ E
[∫ ∞
0
e−δs
(
(u(cs)− yscs)ds)− αu
′(cs)dc
+
t − βu
′(cs)dc
−
t
)]
. (34)
The relation (34) holds for any admissible consumption strategy (c+, c−), we obtain
J(y0, c0) ≥ sup
(c+,c−)∈Π(c)
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−δt
(
h(yt, ct)dt− αu
′(ct)dc
+
t − βu
′(ct)dc
−
t
)]
.
(Proof of 2.)
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By assumption, we can show that in (31)
E[(A)] = E[(B)] = E[(C)] = E[(D)] = E[(E)] = 0 for the process Mc
∗
t .
This implies that {Mc
∗
t }t≥0 is a martingale and
J(y0, c0) = E
[∫ T
0
e−δs
(
(u(c∗)− ysc
∗)ds− αu′(c∗)dc∗,+t − βu
′(c∗)dc∗,−t
)]
+ e−δTJ(yT , cT ). (35)
The transversality condition leads to
J(y0, c0) = E
[∫ ∞
0
e−δs
(
(u(c∗)− ysc
∗)ds− αu′(c∗)dc∗,+t − βu
′(c∗)dc∗,−t
)]
. (36)
Thus,
J(y0, c0) = sup
(c+,c−)∈Π(c)
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−δs
(
(u(c)− ysc)ds− αu
′(c)dc+t − βu
′(c)dc−t
)]
and the consumption strategy (c∗,+, c∗,−) attains the maximum. Hence (c∗,+, c∗,−) is the optimal.
Now, we will obtain the analytic characterization of the dual value function by using the the
variational inequality (16).
As Dai and Yi (2009), we consider the double obstacle problem arising from variational in-
equality (16) as follows:
Lw(y, c) + u′(c)− y ≥ 0, for w(y, c) = αu′(c),
Lw(y, c) + u′(c)− y ≤ 0, for w(y, c) = −βu′(c),
Lw(y, c) + u′(c)− y = 0, for − βu′(c) < w(y, c) < αu′(c),
(37)
Consider the following substitution:
w(y, c) = u′(c)H(z) and z =
y
u′(c)
.
Then, the double obstacle problem (37) can be changed by
LH(z) + 1− z ≥ 0, for H(z) = α,
LH(z) + 1− z ≤ 0, for H(z) = −β,
LH(z) + 1− z = 0, for − β < H(z) < α,
(38)
The following proposition provides the exact solution of the double obstacle problem (38).
Proposition A.1. The variational inequality (38) has a unique C1-solution, which is
H(z) =

α, for z ≤ bα,
D1
(
z
bα
)m1
+D2
(
z
bα
)m2
+
1
δ
−
z
r
, for bα < z < bβ,
−β, for z ≥ bβ ,
(39)
where
D1 =
(α− 1
δ
)m2 + (m2 − 1)
bα
r
m2 −m1
, D2 =
(α− 1
δ
)m1 + (m1 − 1)
bα
r
m1 −m2
,
and m1,m2 are positive and negative roots of following quadratic equation:
θ2
2
m2 + (δ − r −
θ2
2
)m− δ = 0.
and bα, bβ are defined as
bα = (1− δα)
m1 − 1
m1
1
κ
wm1 − 1
wm1−1 − 1
, bβ = (1 + δβ)
m1 − 1
m1
wm1 − κ
wm1 − w
.
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with κ =
1− δα
1 + δβ
.
Here, w is the unique root to the equation f(w) = 0 in (0, 1), where
f(w) = (m1 − 1)m2(1−w
1−m2 )(wm1 − κ)−m1(m2 − 1)(w
m1 − w)(1− κw−m2). (40)
Also,
H ′(bα) = H
′(bβ) = 0, H
′(z) < 0 for z ∈ (bα, bβ)
and H ′(z) attains minimum at bm ∈ (bα, bβ) defined by
bm = bα ·
(
−D2m2(m2 − 1)
D1m1(m1 − 1)
) 1
m1−m2
.
Proof. The uniqueness of the solution is guaranteed due to the maximum principle of the partial
differential equation theory(see Lieberman (1996)).
Now, we will prove the remain part of proposition in the following steps.
(Step 1) We first consider the following free boundary problem:
LH + 1− z = 0, bα < z < bβ,
H(bα) = α, H
′(bα) = 0,
H(bβ) = −β, H
′(bβ) = 0.
(41)
Then we can extend the solution H onto R+ by
H(z) = α if z ∈ (0, bα) and H(z) = −β if z ∈ (bβ ,∞). (42)
Next, we show that H(z) is the solution to variational inequality (38). We can let the general
solution for (41) in the form of
H(z) = D1
(
z
bα
)m1
+D2
(
z
bβ
)m2
+
1
δ
−
z
r
.
From the smooth-pasting condition H(bα) = α and H
′(bα) = 0,
H(bα) = D1 +D2 +
1
δ
−
bα
r
= α,
H ′(bα) = m1D1 +m2D2 −
1
r
= 0.
(43)
Therefore, D1 and D2 are given by
D1 =
(α− 1
δ
)m2 + (m2 − 1)
bα
r
m2 −m1
, D2 =
(α− 1
δ
)m1 + (m1 − 1)
bα
r
m1 −m2
. (44)
Similarly,
H(bβ) = D1
(
bβ
bα
)m1
+D2
(
bβ
bα
)m2
+
1
δ
−
bβ
r
= −β,
H ′(bβ) =
m1D1
bα
(
bβ
bα
)m1−1
+
m2D2
bα
(
bβ
bα
)m2−1
−
1
r
= 0,
(45)
and
D1 =
−(β + 1
δ
)m2 + (m2 − 1)
bβ
r
m2 −m1
(
bα
bβ
)m1
, D2 =
−(β + 1
δ
)m1 + (m1 − 1)
bβ
r
m1 −m2
(
bα
bβ
)m2
. (46)
From (44) and (46),
(α−
1
δ
)m2 + (m2 − 1)
bα
r
=
(
−(β +
1
δ
)m2 + (m2 − 1)
bβ
r
)
·
(
bα
bβ
)m1
,
(α−
1
δ
)m1 + (m1 − 1)
bα
r
=
(
−(β +
1
δ
)m1 + (m1 − 1)
bβ
r
)
·
(
bα
bβ
)m2
.
(47)
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Let us define
w =
bα
bβ
.
From (47),
m2
m1
(α− 1
δ
) + (β + 1
δ
)wm1
(α− 1
δ
) + (β + 1
δ
)wm2
=
m2 − 1
m1 − 1
wm1 − w
wm2 − w
. (48)
From (48), we define f(w) as (18).
(Step 2) f(w) has a unique solution w ∈ (0, 1) and w ∈ (0, κ).
For w ∈ (κ, 1),
f(w) =w−m2 ((m1 − 1)m2(w
m2 − w)(wm1 − κ)−m1(m2 − 1)(w
m1 − w)(wm2 − κ))
<w−m2 ((m1 − 1)m2(w
m2 − w)(wm1 − κ)−m1(m2 − 1)(w
m1 − κ)(wm2 − κ))
=w−m2(wm1 − κ)(wm2 − κ)(m1 −m2)
<0.
(49)
On the other hand,
f(0) =(m1 − 1)m2(−κ) > 0,
f(κ) =(m1 − 1)m2(1− κ
(1−m2))(κm1 − κ)−m1(m2 − 1)(κ
m1 − κ)(1− κ1−m2)
=(m1 −m2)(1− κ
(1−m2))(κm1 − κ) < 0.
(50)
By the Intermediate Value Theorem, there exists w ∈ (0, κ) such that f(w) = 0. To show
“uniqueness”, it is suffice to show that
f ′′(w) > 0, w ∈ (0, κ).
Then,
f(w) =w−m2 ((m1 − 1)m2(w
m2 − w)(wm1 − κ) −m1(m2 − 1)(w
m1 − w)(wm2 − κ))
=(m1 −m2)w
m1 + (m1 −m2)κw
1−m2 − (m1 − 1)m2w
m1−m2+1 − κ(m1 − 1)m2
+m1(m2 − 1)w + κm1(m2 − 1)w
m1−m2 ,
(51)
and
f ′′(w) =(m1 −m2)m1(m1 − 1)w
m1−2 + κ(m1 −m2)(1−m2)(−m2)w
−m2−1
−(m1 − 1)m2(m1 −m2 + 1)(m1 −m2)w
m1−m2−1
+κm1(m2 − 1)(m1 −m2)(m1 −m2 − 1)w
m1−m2−2
=(m1 −m2)
(
m1(m1 − 1)w
m1−2 + κm2(m2 − 1)w
−m2−1 − (m1 − 1)m2(m1 −m2 + 1)w
m1−m2−1
+ κm1(m2 − 1)(m1 −m2 − 1)w
m1−m2−2
)
=(m1 −m2)
m1(m1 − 1)wm1−2 − (m1 − 1)m2m1wm1−m2−1 + κm1(m2 − 1)(m1 − 1)wm1−m2−2︸ ︷︷ ︸
(A)
+ κm2(m2 − 1)w
−m2−1 + (m1 − 1)m2(m2 − 1)w
m1−m2−1 − κm1(m2 − 1)m2w
m1−m2−2︸ ︷︷ ︸
(B)
 .
(52)
Let us temporarily denote
f1(w) = (1−m2w
1−m2 + (m2 − 1)κw
−m2 ).
Since
f ′1(w) = −m2(1−m2)w
−m2 − (m2 − 1)m2κw
−m2−1 = (−m2)(1−m2)w
−m2−1(w − κ) < 0,
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(A) =m1(m1 − 1)(w
m1−2 −m2w
m1−m2−1 + κ(m2 − 1)w
m1−m2−2)
=m1(m1 − 1)w
m1−2 (1−m2w
1−m2 + (m2 − 1)κw
−m2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=f1(w)
>m1(m1 − 1)w
m2−2g1(κ) = m1(m1 − 1)w
m2−2f1(κ) = m1(m1 − 1)w
m2−2(1− κ1−m2 )
>0.
(53)
Let us temporarily denote
f2(w) = (κ+ (m1 − 1)w
m1 − κm1w
m1−1).
Since
f ′2(w) = m1(m1 − 1)w
m1−1 − κm1(m1 − 1)w
m1−2 = m1(m1 − 1)w
m1−2(w − κ) < 0,
(B) =m2(m2 − 1)(κw
−m2−1 + (m1 − 1)w
m1−m2−1 − κm1w
m1−m2−2)
=m2(m2 − 1)w
−m2−1 (κ+ (m1 − 1)w
m1 − κm1w
m1−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=f2(w)
>m2(m2 − 1)w
−m2−1f2(κ) = m2(m2 − 1)w
−m2−1κ(1− κm1−1) > 0.
(54)
By (52), (53) and (54), we can conclude that
f ′′(w) > 0 on (0, κ)
and f(w) has a unique solution w on (0, 1) with w ∈ (0, κ).
(Step 3) The two free boundaries bα and bβ are uniquely determined. Moreover, 0 < bα <
(1− δα) and (1 + δβ) < bβ <∞.
From (47),
bα = (1− δα)
m1 − 1
m1
1
κ
wm1 − 1
wm1−1 − 1
and bβ = (1 + δβ)
m1 − 1
m1
wm1 − κ
wm1 − w
.
Thus, bα and bβ are uniquely determined.
Let us temporarily denote
f3(w) = w
m1 −m1w + κm1 − κ.
Since
f ′3(w) = m1(w
m1−1 − 1) > 0 and f3(0) > 0,
we deduce that
f3(w) > 0 on (0, κ).
This leads to
m1 − 1
m1
wm1 − κ
wm1 − w
> 1
and bβ > (1 + δβ).
Let us also temporarily denote
f4(w) = (m1 − 1)w
m1 − κm1w
m1−1 + κ.
Since
f ′4(w) = (m1 − 1)m1w
m1−2(w − κ) < 0 and f4(κ) = κ− κ
m1 > 0,
we deduce that
f4(w) > 0 on (0, κ).
This leads to
m1 − 1
m1
1
κ
wm1 − 1
wm1−1 − 1
< 1
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and bα < (1− δα).
(Step 4) In z ∈ (bα, bβ), H
′(z) < 0 and attains minimum at bm.
First, we will show that
D1 > 0 and D2 < 0.
Since
D1 =
(α− 1
δ
)m2 + (m2 − 1)
bα
r
m2 −m1
, D2 =
(α− 1
δ
)m1 + (m1 − 1)
bα
r
m1 −m2
,
D1 > 0 ⇐⇒ (α−
1
δ
)m2 + (m2 − 1)
bα
r
< 0.
⇐⇒ bα >
−m2
m2 − 1
r
δ
(1− δα).
⇐⇒ (1− δα)
m1 − 1
m1
1
κ
wm1 − 1
wm1−1 − 1
>
−m2
m2 − 1
r
δ
(1− δα).
⇐⇒
1
κ
wm1 − 1
wm1−1 − 1
> 1.
⇐⇒ κwm1−1 > wm1 .
(55)
Similarly, we can deduce that D2 < 0.
We know that H ′(bα) = H
′(bβ) = 0 and
H ′′(z) =
D1m1(m1 − 1)
b2α
(
z
bα
)m1−2
+
D2m2
b2α
(
z
bα
)m2−2
.
Since H ′′(bm) = 0, it is enough to show that
bα < bm < bβ .
By the definition of bm,
bα < bm < bβ ⇐⇒ 1 <
(
−D2m2(m2 − 1)
D1m1(m1 − 1)
) 1
m1−m2
<
1
x
.
Since
D1 =
(α− 1
δ
)m2 + (m2 − 1)
bα
r
m2 −m1
, D2 =
(α− 1
δ
)m1 + (m1 − 1)
bα
r
m1 −m2
,
we can easily check that
1 <
(
−D2m2(m2 − 1)
D1m1(m1 − 1)
) 1
m1−m2
⇐⇒ bα < (1− δα).
Also, we know that
D1 =
−(β + 1
δ
)m2 + (m2 − 1)
bβ
r
m2 −m1
(
bα
bβ
)m1
, D2 =
−(β + 1
δ
)m1 + (m1 − 1)
bβ
r
m1 −m2
(
bα
bβ
)m2
.
This implies that (
−D2m2(m2 − 1)
D1m1(m1 − 1)
) 1
m1−m2
<
1
x
⇐⇒ bβ > (1 + δβ).
Thus, we deduce that
bα < bm < bβ .
and
H ′′(z) < 0, on (bα, bm) and H
′′(z) > 0, on (bm, bβ).
Hence, H ′(z) attains minimum at z = bm and H
′(z) < 0 on (bα, bβ).
(Step 4) H(z) satisfies the variational inequality (38).
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• For z ∈ (bα, bβ). it is clear that
LH + 1− z = 0. (56)
Since H(bα) = α, H(bβ) = −β and H
′(z) is strictly decreasing function on (bα, bβ),
−β < H(z) < α on (bα, bβ).
• For z ≤ bα, H(z) = α and
LH + 1− z = 1− δα− z ≥ 0.
• For z ≥ bβ , H(z) = −β and
LH + 1− z = 1 + δβ − z ≤ 0.
From (Step 1) ∼ (Step 4), we have proved the desired result.
By Proposition A.1, w(y, c) given by
w(y, c) =

αu′(c), for
y
u′(c)
≤ bα,
D1u
′(c)
(
y
u′(c)bα
)m1
+D2u
′(c)
(
y
u′(c)bα
)m2
+
u′(c)
δ
−
y
r
, for bα <
y
u′(c)
< bβ ,
−βu′(c), for
y
u′(c)
≥ bβ,
(57)
is a solution of the double obstacle problem (37).
Using the w(y, c) in the equation (57), we construct the dual value function J(y, c) as follows:
(i) For bαu
′(c) < y < bβu
′(c),
J(y, c) =
∫ c
0
u′(x)D1
(
y
u′(x)bα
)m1
dx−
∫ ∞
c
u′(x)D2
(
y
u′(x)bα
)m2
dx+
u(c)
δ
−
yc
r
(58)
(ii) For bαu
′(c) ≥ y,
J(y, c) = J
(
y, I(
y
bα
)
)
+ α
(
u(c)− u(I(
y
bα
))
)
. (59)
(iii) For bβu
′(c) ≤ y,
J(y, c) = J
(
y, I(
y
bβ
)
)
− β
(
u(c)− u(I(
y
bβ
))
)
. (60)
where the function I(·) : R+ → R+ is defined by
I(y) ≡ (u′)−1(y) = y−
1
γ .
Remark A.1. It is easy to check that
m1 > 1 and m2 < 0.
and for u(c) = c
1−γ
1−γ
with γ( 6= 1) > 0,
m2 < −
1− γ
γ
< m1.
Thus, the two integrals in (58) are well-defined and J(y, c) is
J(y, c) = D1
yc
(1− γ + γm1)bα
(
y
c−γbα
)m1−1
+D2
yc
(1− γ + γm2)bα
(
y
c−γbα
)m2−1
+
1
δ
c1−γ
1− γ
−
yc
r
.
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Remark A.2. For J(y, c) defined in (58), (59) and (60), we can easily confirm that
Jc(y, c) = w(y, c).
Proposition A.2. For the function J(y, c) defined in (58), (59) and (60), the following state-
ments are true:
1. J(y, c) is a twice continuously differentiable and satisfies the HJB equaton (16). Moreover,
the regions IR, NR and DR are represented by
IR = {(y, c) ∈ R | y ≤ u′(c)bα},
NR = {(y, c) ∈ R | u′(c)bα < y < u
′(c)bβ},
DR = {(y, c) ∈ R | u′(c)bβ ≤ y},
respectively.
2. For any admissible consumption strategy (c+, c−),∫ t
0
(−θ)ysJy(ys, cs)ds, ∀t ≥ 0
is a martingale.
3. For any admissible consumption strategy (c+, c−),
lim
t→∞
e−δtE [J(yt, ct)] = 0.
Proof.
(Proof of 1.)
First, with reference to the construction of the dual value function J(y, c), we will show that
J is a continuously differentiable if we prove that Jy , Jyy, and Jcc are continuous along the free
boundaries c = I( y
bα
) and c = I( y
bβ
).
Then, we can compute
Jy(y, c) =Jy(y, I(
y
bα
)) +
(
Jc(y, I(
y
bα
))− αu′(I(
y
bα
))
)
d
dy
(
I(
y
bα
)
)
for y ≤ u′(c)bα
=Jy(y, I(
y
bα
)),
(61)
and
Jy(y, c) =Jy(y, I(
y
bβ
))−
(
−Jc(y, I(
y
bβ
)− βu′(I(
y
bα
))
)
d
dy
(
I(
y
bβ
)
)
for y ≥ u′(c)bβ
=Jy(y, I(
y
bβ
)).
(62)
Thus, Jy(y, c) is continuous along the free boundaries.
Similarly, we can obtain
Jyy(y, c) =Jyy(y, I(
y
bα
)), for y ≤ u′(c)bα,
Jyy(y, c) =Jyy(y, I(
y
bβ
)), for y ≤ u′(c)bβ ,
(63)
and hence Jyy is continuous along the free boundaries.
We know that Jc(y, c) = u
′(c)H(y/u′(c)) and H(z) is C1-function. Thus, it is clear that
Jcc(y, c) is continuous function and we conclude that J(y, c) is C
2-function.
Next, we will show that J(y, c) satisfies the HJB-equation (16).
• The region NR:
Since Jc(y, c) = u
′(c)H(y/u′(c)),
NR ={(y, c) ∈ R | −βu′(c) < Jc(y, c) < αu
′(c)}
={(y, c) ∈ R | −β < H(
y
u′(c)
) < α}
={(y, c) ∈ R | bα <
y
u′(c)
< bβ}.
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Also, we can easily confirm that
LJ + u(c)− yc = 0.
• The region IR:
We deduce that
IR = {(y, c) ∈ R | Jc(y, c) = αu
′(c)}
= {(y, c) ∈ R |
y
u′(c)
≤ bα}.
Clearly,
−Jc(y, c)− βu
′(c) = −(α+ β)u′(c) < 0.
Since Jy(y, c) = Jy(y, I(
y
bα
)) and Jyy(y, c) = Jyy(y, I(
y
bα
)) on IR,
LJ(y, c) + u(c)− yc
=
(
LJ(y, I(
y
bα
)) + u(I(
y
bα
))− yI(
y
bα
)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+δJ(y, I(
y
bα
))− δJ(y, c) + u(c)− yc
−(u(I(
y
bα
))− yI(
y
bα
))
=
∫ I( y
bα
)
c
(
δJc(y, η)− (u
′(η)− y)
)
dη
=
∫ I( y
bα
)
c
u′(η)
(
y
u′(η)
− (1− δα)
)
dη ≤ 0
(
∵
y
u′(η)
< bα < 1− δα on IR
)
.
(64)
• The region DR:
Similarly,
DR = {(y, c) ∈ R | Jc(y, c) = βu
′(c)}
= {(y, c) ∈ R |
y
u′(c)
≥ bβ}.
and
Jc(y, c)− αu
′(c) = −(α+ β)u′(c) < 0,
Since Jy(y, c) = Jy(y, I(
y
bβ
)) and Jyy(y, c) = Jyy(y, I(
y
bβ
)) on IR,
LJ(y, c) + u(c)− yc
=
(
LJ(y, I(
y
bβ
)) + u(I(
y
bβ
))− yI(
y
bβ
)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+δJ(y, I(
y
bα
))
−δJ(y, c) + u(c)− yc− (u(I(
y
bα
))− yI(
y
bα
))
=−
∫ c
I( y
bβ
)
(
δJc(y, η)− (u
′(η)− y)
)
dη
=−
∫ c
I( y
bβ
)
u′(η)
(
y
u′(η)
− (1 + δβ)
)
dη ≤ 0
(
∵
y
u′(η)
> bβ > 1 + δβ on DR
)
.
(65)
Thus, J(y, c) satisfies the HJB-equation
max{LJ + u(c)− yc, Jc − αu
′(c),−Jc − βu
′(c)} = 0.
(Proof of 2.)
Let
Nt =
∫ t
0
e−δs(−θys)Jy(ys, cs)dBs.
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To show the process Nt is a martingale, it is suffice to prove that
E
[∫ t
0
(
e−δs(−θys)Jy(ys, cs)
)2
dt
]
<∞, for ∀t ≥ 0.
(see Chapter 3 in Oksendal (2005))
First, we consider the case when (yt, ct) ∈ NR. Then,
I(
yt
bα
) < ct < I(
yt
bβ
) or bα <
(
yt
u′(ct)
)
< bβ .
Since
yJy(y, c) =
D1m1yc
(1− γ + γm1)bα
(
y
u′(c)bα
)m1−1
+
D2m2yc
(1− γ + γm2)bα
(
y
u′(c)bα
)m2−1
−
yc
r
,
there exist constants K11,K12 > 0 such that
|ytJy(yt, ct)| ≤ K11ytct ≤ K12(yt)
− 1−γ
γ . (66)
When (yt, ct) ∈ IR, we know that
Jy(yt, ct) =Jy(yt, I(
yt
bα
)), if (yt, ct) ∈ IR.
In this case,
yJy(y, I(
y
bα
)) =
D1m1yI(
y
bα
)
(1− γ + γm1)bα
+
D2m2yI(
y
bα
)
(1− γ + γm2)bα
−
yI( y
bα
)
r
,
Thus, there exist constants K21,K22 > 0 such that
|ytJy(yt, ct)| ≤ K21ytI(
yt
bα
) ≤ K22(yt)
− 1−γ
γ . (67)
Similarly, when (yt, ct) ∈ DR, there exist constants K31,K32 > 0 such that
|ytJy(yt, ct)| ≤ K31ytI(
yt
bβ
) ≤ K32(yt)
− 1−γ
γ . (68)
By (66), (67) and (68), for any (yt, ct) ∈ R,
|ytJy(yt, ct)| K¯4(yt)
−
1−γ
γ .
for some constant K4 > 0.
Hence
E
[∫ t
0
(
e−δs(−θys)Jy(ys, cs)
)2
dt
]
≤ K4E
[
e−δt(y
− 1−γ
γ
t )
2
]
= K4
∫ t
0
e−(K−
θ2
2
(
γ−1
γ
)2)sds <∞. (69)
This implies that Kt is a martingale for t ≥ 0.
(Proof of 3.)
If (yt, ct) ∈ NR, then
bα <
(
yt
u′(ct)
)
< bβ.
Since,
|J(y, c)| =
∣∣∣∣∣D1 yc(1− γ + γm1)bα
(
y
c−γbα
)m1−1
+D2
yc
(1− γ + γm2)bβ
(
y
c−γbβ
)m2−1
+
1
δ
c1−γ
1− γ
−
yc
r
∣∣∣∣∣ (70)
there exists a constant K51 > 0 such that
|J(yt, ct)| ≤ K51(yt)
− 1−γ
γ . (71)
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When (yt, ct) ∈ IR, we know that
J(yt, ct) = J
(
yt, I(
yt
bα
)
)
+ α
(
u(ct)− u(I(
yt
bα
))
)
. (72)
Thus, there exits a constant K52 such that
|J(yt, ct)| ≤ K52(yt)
− 1−γ
γ + α|u(ct)|. (73)
Similarly, for (yt, ct) ∈ DR, there exists a constant K53 such that
|J(yt, ct)| ≤ K53(yt)
−
1−γ
γ + β|u(ct)|. (74)
By (71), (73) and (74), for any (yt, ct) ∈ R, there exist a constant K54 > 0 such that
|J(yt, ct)| ≤ K54
(
(yt)
− 1−γ
γ + |u(ct)|
)
. (75)
By the admissibility of the consumption strategy,
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−δt|u(ct)|dt
]
< +∞.
Since {ct}
∞
t=0 is a finite variation process, its sample paths can have at most countable disconti-
nuities. Hence, applying Fubini’s theorem, we deduce that∫ ∞
0
E
[
e−δt|u(ct)|
]
dt = E
[∫ ∞
0
e−δt|u(ct)|dt
]
< +∞.
and
lim
t→∞
E
[
e−δt|u(ct)|
]
= 0.
From (75),
lim
t→∞
E
[
e−δt|J(yt, ct)|
]
≤K54
(
lim
t→∞
E
[
e−δt(yt)
−
1−γ
γ
]
+ lim
t→∞
E
[
e−δt|u(ct)|dt
])
= 0. (76)
Thus, we can conclude that for any admissible consumption strategy (c+, c−) and its associated
consumption process c,
lim
t→∞
E
[
e−δtJ(yt, ct)
]
= 0.
B Proof of Theorem 3.1
We will show that the duality relationship in the following steps:
(Step 1) First, we will prove that the dual value function J(y, c) is strictly convex in y:
By direct computation,
y
∂2J
∂y2
=c
(
D1m1(m1 − 1)
(1− γ + γm1)bα
(
y
c−γbα
)m1−1
+
D2m2(m2 − 1)
(1− γ + γm2)bα
(
y
c−γbα
)m2−1)
. (77)
Since
D1 > 0, D2 < 0, 1− γ + γm1 > 0, and 1− γ + γm2 < 0,
we deuce that
∂2J
∂y2
> 0 for y > 0,
and thus J(y, c) is strictly convex in y.
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Let us denote the Lagrangian L defined in (14) by L(y, c) for the Lagrangian multiplier y
and consumption profile c.
(Step 2) We will show that there exist a unique solution y∗ > 0 such that y∗ and the optimal
consumption {c∗t }
∞
t=0 maximize the Lagrangian L(y, c).
From Proposition 3.1, we deduce that
∂J
∂y
(y, c) =

c
r
−
(
D1m1c
(1− γ + γm1)bα
(
y
c−γbα
)m1−1
+
D2m2c
(1− γ + γm2)bα
(
y
c−γbα
)m2−1)
,
for (y, c) ∈ NR,
∂J
∂y
(
y, I(
y
bα
)
)
, for (y, c) ∈ IR,
∂J
∂y
(
y, I(
y
bβ
)
)
, for (y, c) ∈ DR.
(78)
For a sufficiently small y > 0,
(y, c) ∈ IR,
and for a sufficiently large y > 0,
(y, c) ∈ DR.
This implies that
lim
y→0
∂J
∂y
(y, c) = lim
y→0
∂J
∂y
(
y, I(
y
bα
)
)
= +∞,
lim
y→∞
∂J
∂y
(y, c) = lim
y→∞
∂J
∂y
(
y, I(
y
bβ
)
)
= 0.
(79)
Since J(y, c) is strictly convex in y, for given X > 0, there exists a unique y∗ such that
X = −
∂J
∂y
(y∗, c). (80)
Thus, there exist optimal consumption strategy (c∗,+, c∗,−) such that
J(y∗, c) = E
[∫ ∞
0
e−δt
(
h(y∗t , c
∗
t )dt− αu
′(c∗t )dc
∗,+
t − βu
′(c∗t )dc
∗,−
t
)]
, (81)
where y∗t = y
∗eβtHt, (c
∗,+, c∗,−) ∈ Π(c) and c∗t = c+ c
∗,+
t − c
∗,−
t .
This means that since the Lagrangian is concave, y∗ and c∗ are maximizers of the Lagrangian.
(Step 3) c∗ satisfies the budget constraint with equality.
Define y+h = y∗+h and y−h = y∗−h with y∗ ≥ h > 0 (For convenience of notation we drop
the time subscript t). Then,
L(c∗, y±h) ≥ L(c∗, y∗).
Since c∗, y∗ maximizers of the Lagrangian L, we have
lim sup
h↓0
L(c∗, y+h)− L(c∗, y∗)
h
≤ 0, lim inf
h↑0
L(c∗, y−h)−L(c∗, y∗)
h
≤ 0,
and thus we deduce
±
(
X − E
[∫ ∞
0
Htc
∗
t dt
])
≤ 0.
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This leads to
X = E
[∫ ∞
0
Htc
∗
t dt
]
This implies that c∗ satisfies the budget constraint with equality.
(Step 4) c∗ is optimal consumption.
Let (c+, c−) ∈ Π(c) be a feasible consumption strategy, i.e., it is admissible and satisfies the
budget constraint.
Since c satisfies the budget constraint,
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−δt
(
u(ct)dt− αu
′(ct)dc
+
t − βu
′(ct)dc
−
t
)]
≤E
[∫ ∞
0
e−δt
(
u(ct)dt− αu
′(ct)dc
+
t − βu
′(ct)dc
−
t
)]
+ y∗
(
X − E
[∫ ∞
0
Htctdt
]) (82)
where y∗ is defined in (Step 2).
Since y∗ and c∗ maximize the Lagrangian L and c∗ satisfies the budget constraint with
equality,
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−δt
(
u(ct)dt− αu
′(ct)dc
+
t − βu
′(ct)dc
−
t
)]
≤E
[∫ ∞
0
e−δt
(
u(ct)dt− αu
′(ct)dc
+
t − βu
′(ct)dc
−
t
)]
+ y∗
(
X − E
[∫ ∞
0
Htctdt
])
≤E
[∫ ∞
0
e−δt
(
u(c∗t )dt− αu
′(c∗t )dc
∗,+
t − βu
′(c∗t )dc
∗,−
t
)]
+ y∗
(
X − E
[∫ ∞
0
Htc
∗
t dt
])
=E
[∫ ∞
0
e−δt
(
u(c∗t )dt− αu
′(c∗t )dc
∗,+
t − βu
′(c∗t )dc
∗,−
t
)]
.
(83)
Therefore, (c∗t )
∞
t=0 is optimal.
Step 5) Proof of duality-relationship in (20)
Since c∗ is optimal consumption, for y > 0, we deduce
V (X, c) = E
[∫ ∞
0
e−δt
(
u(c∗t )dt− αu
′(c∗t )dc
∗,+
t − βu
′(c∗t )dc
∗,−
t
)]
= E
[∫ ∞
0
e−δt
(
u(c∗t )dt− αu
′(c∗t )dc
∗,+
t − βu
′(c∗t )dc
∗,−
t
)]
+ y
(
X − E
[∫ ∞
0
Htc
∗
t dt
])
≤ sup
(c+,c−)∈Π(c)
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−δtu(ct)dt
]
+ y
(
X − E
[∫ ∞
0
Htctdt
])
= J(y, c) + yX,
where (ct)∞t= is the optimal consumption process for Problem 3 for y > 0. This implies that
V (X, c) ≤ inf
y>0
(
J(y, c) + yX
)
.
However, we know that
V (X, c) = E
[∫ ∞
0
e−δt
(
u(c∗t )dt− αu
′(c∗t )dc
∗,+
t − βu
′(c∗t )dc
∗,−
t
)]
= J(y∗, c) + y∗X.
Thus,
V (X, c) = min
y>0
(
J(y, c) + yX
)
.
This completes the proof.
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C Proof of Proposition 3.2
First, we show that the optimal consumption strategy (c∗,+, c∗,−) given in (21) is admissible. We
can see that for optimal consumption strategy (c∗,+, c∗,−) and its associated consumption c∗,
bα ≤
yt
(c∗t )
−γ
≤ bβ for ∀ t ≥ 0. (84)
Then, there exist constants K61,K62 > 0 such that
|u(c∗t )| ≤ K61(yt)
− 1−γ
γ and ytc
∗
t ≤ K62y
− 1−γ
γ
t , (85)
for all t ≥ 0.
Thus,
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−δt|u(c∗t )|dt
]
≤ K61E
[∫ ∞
0
e−δt(yt)
−
1−γ
γ dt
]
< +∞.
Since (c∗,+t , c
∗,−
t ) is the optimal strategy, it is clear that
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−δt
(
αu′(c∗t )dc
∗,+
t + βu
′(c∗t )dc
∗,−
t
)]
< +∞.
Above two inequalities imply (c∗,+t , c
∗,−
t ) is admissible consumption strategy.
Moreover, by (84) and (85), there exists a constant K64 > 0 such that
|J(yt, c
∗
t )| =
∣∣∣∣∣D1 ytc∗t(1− γ + γm1)bα
(
yt
(c∗t )
−γbα
)m1−1
+D2
ytc
∗
t
(1− γ + γm2)bβ
(
yt
(c∗t )
−γbβ
)m2−1
+
1
δ
(c∗t )
1−γ
1− γ
−
ytc
∗
t
r
∣∣∣∣
≤K64(yt)
− 1−γ
γ
(86)
This implies
lim
t→∞
E
[
e−δt|J(yt, c
∗
t )|
]
≤K64 lim
t→∞
EE
[
e−δt(yt)
− 1−γ
γ
]
=K64 lim
t→∞
e−Kt = 0.
(87)
From the construction of the optimal consumption strategy, it is easy to check that the
consumption strategy (c∗,+, c∗,−) given in (21) satisfies the following assumption in Theorem
A.1:
(yt, c
∗
t ) ∈ {(y, c) ∈ R : LJ(y, c) + h(y, c) = 0} ,
Lebesgue-a.e., P-a.s.,∫ t
0
e−δs
(
Jc(ys, c
∗
s)− αu
′(c∗s)
)
dc∗,+s = 0, for all t ≥ 0, P− a.s.,∫ t
0
e−δs
(
−Jc(ys, c
∗
s)− βu
′(c∗s)
)
dc∗,−s = 0, for all t ≥ 0, P− a.s.
(88)
D Proof of Theorem 3.2
From Theorem 3.1, we know that there exists a unique solution y∗ for the minimization problem
(20). The first-order condition implies that
X =−
∂J
∂y
(y∗, c)
=
c
r
−
(
D1m1c
(1− γ + γm1)bα
(
y
c−γbα
)m1−1
+
D2m2c
(1− γ + γm2)bα
(
y
c−γbα
)m2−1)
.
(89)
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Since Problem 3 is time-consistent, y∗s = y
∗eδsHs is the minimizer for the duality relationship
starting at s ≥ 0. Thus, for optimal wealth X∗s at time s, we have
X∗s =
c∗s
r
− c∗s
(
D1m1
(1− γ + γm1)bα
(
y∗s
(c∗s)
−γbα
)m1−1
+
D2m2
(1− γ + γm2)bα
(
y∗s
(c∗s)
−γbα
)m2−1)
. (90)
During the time in which y∗t is inside the NR, the optimal consumption c
∗ is constant, i.e.,
c∗t = c
∗
s and thus the optimal wealth X
∗
t for t ≥ s is given by
X∗t =
c∗s
r
− c∗s
(
D1m1
(1− γ + γm1)bα
(
y∗t
(c∗s)
−γbα
)m1−1
+
D2m2
(1− γ + γm2)bα
(
y∗t
(c∗s)
−γbα
)m2−1)
. (91)
By Proposition 3.2, we know that the agent does not increase or decrease his/her consumption
in the region
bα <
y∗t
(c∗t )
−γ
< bβ.
Let us define x, x¯ as follows:
x = X (bβ), x¯ = X (bα),
where X (y) is
X (y) =
1
r
−
(
D1m1
(1− γ + γm1)bα
(
y
bα
)m1−1
+
D2m2
(1− γ + γm2)bα
(
y
bα
)m2−1)
.
Since
∂X
∂y
(y) = −
(
D1m1(m1 − 1)
(1− γ + γm1)b2α
(
y
bα
)m1−2
+
D2m2(m2 − 1)
(1− γ + γm2)b2α
(
y
bα
)m2−2)
and D1 > 0, D2 < 0, 1− γ+ γm1 > 0, and 1− γ+ γm2 < 0, X (y) is strictly increasing function
of y.
This means that the consumption stays for t ≥ s constant if and only if
c∗sx < X
∗
t < c
∗
s x¯.
This completes the proof.
E Proof of Proposition 3.3
Proof of (a).
By applying the generalized Ito´’s lemma(see Harrison (1985)) to the optimal wealth process
X∗t ,
dX∗t =−
∂2J
∂y2
(y∗t , c
∗
t )dy
∗
t −
1
2
∂3J
∂y3
(y∗t , c
∗
t )(dy
∗
t )
2 −
∂2J
∂y∂c
(y∗t , c
∗
t )dc
∗,+
t
+
∂2J
∂y∂c
(y∗t , c
∗
t )dc
∗,−
t .
(92)
If (y∗t , c
∗
t ) ∈ NR, the agent does not adjust his/her consumption. This means that dc
∗,+
t =
dc∗,−t = 0 and thus
∂2J
∂y∂c
(y∗t , c
∗
t )dc
∗,+
t =
∂2J
∂y∂c
(y∗t , c
∗
t )dc
∗,−
t = 0.
If (y∗t , c
∗
t ) ∈ IR, the agent should increase his/her consumption. This implies that
∂J
∂c
(y∗t , c
∗
t ) = αu
′(c∗t ), dc
∗,−
t = 0,
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and hence
∂2J
∂y∂c
(y∗t , c
∗
t )dc
∗,+
t =
∂2J
∂y∂c
(y∗t , c
∗
t )dc
∗,−
t = 0.
Similarly, we also obtain
∂2J
∂y∂c
(y∗t , c
∗
t )dc
∗,+
t =
∂2J
∂y∂c
(y∗t , c
∗
t )dc
∗,−
t = 0.
when (y∗t , c
∗
t ) ∈ NR.
Therefore, by comparing the equation (92) with the wealth dynamics (1) and using the fact
that dy∗t = (δ − r)y
∗
t dt− θy
∗
t dBt, we deduce the optimal portfolio policy pi
∗
t as follows:
pi∗t =
θ
σ
y∗t
∂2J
∂y2
(y∗t , c
∗
t ), (93)
and
pi∗t =
θ
σ
c∗s
(
D1m1(m1 − 1)
(1− γ + γm1)bα
(
y∗t
(c∗t )
−γbα
)m1−1
+
D2m2(m2 − 1)
(1− γ + γm2)bα
(
y∗t
(c∗t )
−γbα
)m2−1)
. (94)
Proof of (b).
F Proof of Theorem 3.3
For c∗sx < X
∗
t < c
∗
s x¯, for t ≥ s, the consumption stays constant. Thus, for simplicity, we can
assume c∗t = 1.
By Theorem 3.2 and Proposition 3.3, we deduce that
X∗t (y
∗
t )−
γσ
θ
pi∗t (y
∗
t ) = −H
′(y∗t ), (95)
where H(·) is defined in Proposition A.1.
Then,
G(y∗t ) ,
γσ
σ
pi∗t (y
∗
t )
X∗t (y
∗
t )
= 1 +
H ′(y∗t )
X∗t (y
∗
t )
. (96)
Since H ′(bα) = H
′(bβ) = 0,
G(bα) = G(bβ) = 1.
We will show that there exists a unique bˆ ∈ (bα, bβ) such that G(·) is a strictly decreasing
function on (bα, bˆ) and strictly decreasing function on (bˆ, bβ).
G′(y) =
H ′′(y)X(y)−H ′(y)X
′
(y)
(X(y))2
. (97)
(For convenience of notation we drop the time subscript t and the optimal subscript ∗.)
Let us define the numerator of G′(y) as G¯(y), i.e.,
G¯(y) = H ′′(y)X(y)−H ′(y)X ′(y). (98)
By the proof in Proposition A.1, we know that
H ′′(bα) < 0, H
′′(bβ) > 0.
Thus,
G¯(bα) < 0 and G¯(bβ) > 0.
Since
X(y) =
1
r
−
D1m1
(1− γ + γm1)bα
(
y
bα
)m1−1
+
D2m2
(1− γ + γm2)bα
(
y
bα
)m2−1
,
H ′(y) =
D1m1
bα
(
y
bα
)m1−1
+
D2m2
bα
(
y
bβ
)m2−1
−
1
r
,
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we have
X ′(y) =−
D1m1(m1 − 1)
(1− γ + γm1)b2α
(
y
bα
)m1−2
+
D2m2(m2 − 1)
(1− γ + γm2)b2α
(
y
bα
)m2−2
,
H ′(y) =
D1m1(m1 − 1)
b2α
(
y
bα
)m1−2
+
D2m2(m2 − 1)
b2α
(
y
bβ
)m2−2
.
Hence,
G¯(y) =
γ
r
(
D1m1(m1 − 1)
2
(1− γ + γm1)b2α
(
y
bα
)m1−2
+
D2m2(m2 − 1)
2
(1− γ + γm2)b2α
(
y
bα
)m2−2)
−
γD1D2m1m2(m1 −m2)
2
(1− γ + γm1)(1− γ + γm2)b3α
(
y
bα
)m1+m2−3
=
γym2−2
b2α
(
D1m1(m1 − 1)
2
r(1− γ + γm1)
(
y
bα
)m1−m2
−
D1D2m1m2(m1 −m2)
2
(1− γ + γm1)(1− γ + γm2)bα
(
y
bα
)m1−1
+
D2m2(m2 − 1)
2
r(1− γ + γm2)
)
,
γym2−2
b2α
G(y).
We know that
m1 > 1, m2 < 0, D1 > 0, D2 < 0, 1− γ + γm1 > 0 and 1− γ + γm2 < 0,
thus, G(y) is a strictly increasing function of y.
Since G¯(bα) < 0, G¯(bβ) > 0, we deduce that
G(bα) < 0, G(bβ) > 0.
Thus, there exists a unique bˆ ∈ (bα, bβ) such that
G(bˆ) = 0.
This implies that
G′(y) < 0, for y ∈ (bα, bˆ) and G
′(y) > 0, for y ∈ (bˆ, bβ).
To sum up, we conclude that RCRRA is a strictly increasing for X ∈ (cx, X̂) and a strictly
decreasing for X ∈ (X̂, cx¯). Moreover, RCRRA approaches γ when X approaches cx or cx¯.
(Here, Xˆ = cX (bˆ) and bˆ ∈ (bα, bβ) is a unique solution of the following algebraic equation:
G(y) =
D1m1(m1 − 1)
2
r(1− γ + γm1)
(
y
bα
)m1−m2
−
D1D2m1m2(m1 −m2)
2
(1− γ + γm1)(1− γ + γm2)bα
(
y
bα
)m1−1
+
D2m2(m2 − 1)
2
r(1− γ + γm2)
.
(99)
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